PROHIBITION AGAINST INFLUENCE-
PEDDLING
Influence peddling is the illegal practice of using one's connections, influence or money in the government to get favors or preferential treatment for another, usually in return for payment. It is an act of lobbying that bears the stamp of corruption thus unlawful.
Recently, former Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Camilo Sabio faces graft charges for attempting to influence his brother, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. to help a party-litigant in a case pending before the CA. In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Chairman Sabio for two counts of violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and for violation of Article 243 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Joint Resolution narrated that on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a call from his brother Chairman Sabio informing him that he had been named member of the CA division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Chairman Sabio tried to convince Justice Sabio “of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which represents the interest of the poor people.” It was also uncovered that Chairman Sabio received a call from GSIS Board Member Atty. Jesus Santos informing him that the MERALCO-GSIS case was already raffled to the division of Justice Sabio, Atty. Santos requested Chairman Sabio’s intercession to convince Justice Sabio to rule against the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order in favor of MERALCO. Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft Law prohibits public officers from “persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.” On the other hand, Article 243 of the RPC penalizes any “executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice.” Justice Sabio was excluded as respondent in the complaint filed by the Field Investigation Office “since records do not show that he had been influenced by his elder brother.
In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, December 19, 2001, this Resolves the Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2001 filed by counsel for respondent Demetrio G. Demetria, the Manifestation and Motion for Oral Argument dated 13 September 2001 filed by respondent himself, as well as his Letter dated 8 October 2001 praying for reconsideration of the Decision of this Court promulgated 27 March 2001. The records show that on 27 March 2001 respondent was found guilty of interceding in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, who was charged under Sec. 15, Art. III, of R.A. 6425, as amended, thereby violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Consequently, respondent, then an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, was dismissed from the service with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency, or instrumentality, including government owned or controlled corporation or institution. All his benefits were ordered forfeited. In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2001 respondent asserts that he did not intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, nor is there any showing beyond reasonable doubt that he did. Respondent also maintains that "[i]f at all any penalty should be visited upon (him) for what he did . . . a reprimand may perhaps be considered 'appropriate.' " In his Manifestation and Motion for Oral Argument dated 13 September 2001, respondent maintains that "if he were only allowed by this Court to orally argue his case and expound his arguments personally, he believes that he can convince this Court of the justness of his cause." Finally, in hisLetter of 8 October 2001, respondent says that if indeed he committed the acts of interference of which he was found guilty, he respectfully and humbly submits that the penalty imposed on him is too harsh. As found by the Court-appointed investigator, the Honorable Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, on 18 July 2000, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, the pairing Judge for Branch 53 (then left vacant by the demise of its incumbent Judge) was heard and thereafter submitted for resolution. Later, just before lunch time, upon his arrival in his office, SP Pablo C. Formaran III, the public prosecutor handling the case, was informed by his secretary that a call from the Office of Justice Demetria was received and that respondent Justice wanted to speak with him. Since SP Formaran III was still out, a return call was requested. When the return call was made, the voice of the same woman who earlier called answered that respondent Justice was already out for lunch. She then said that she would just call again. At around 1:30 to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent Justice, in the company of Go Teng Kok and Atty Reinerio Paas went to the office of SP Formaran III asking the latter to withdraw the Motion for Inhibition he had earlier filed against Judge Muro. Go Teng Kok pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion while respondent Justice counseled SP Formaran III that the basis for the motion for inhibition, i.e., the unsigned letter of "concerned court employees," was "not strong." Respondent Justice also advised Go Teng Kok to calm down or "keep his cool" as the latter was already becoming too emotional. Respondent also asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Just to put an end to the conversation, SP Formaran III, after politely declining the request, answered that he would bring the matter to CSP Jovencito R. Zuño. "Iyon pala," respondent Justice replied, then stood up, bade SP Formaran III good bye, and left with Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok. Upon returning to his office in the Court of Appeals, respondent Justice called up CSP Zuño and requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion for Inhibition so that Judge Muro could issue an order in the case of Yu Yuk Lai. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwidraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," to which CSP Zuño replied, "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko." From the above narration, we reiterate our ruling that "the evidence is clear, if not overwhelming and damning" that respondent did intercede for suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. While it may be so, as respondent argues, that "what Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes (to be) is not evidence" the same is not merely an expression of her opinion. Her pronouncements were conclusions based on her assessment and appreciation of the evidence presented before her. Like our view on factual findings of the trial court, we accord great weight and the highest respect to the evaluation of Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino, a retired but well respected member of this Court, as her assessment and appreciation of the evidence are quite competent and convincing. Absent any showing of bias, partiality, flaw or grave abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb her findings. Respondent Justice cites the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 10 October 2000 dismissing the charges against him and Go Teng Kok for violation of Sec. 3, par. (a), of R.A. 3019, as amended, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (e), of P.D. 1829, for insufficiency of evidence. He echoes the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman therein that the request to withdraw the motion to inhibit would not result in the delay of the prosecution. On the contrary, it is the filing of the motion to inhibit which would disrupt the proceedings as the case would be re-assigned to a new judge who would have to familiarize himself again with the case and thus delay the prosecution. Respondent Justice even turns the table on SP Formaran III and accuses him of violating the Canons of Professional Responsibility by filing a motion to inhibit based on an unsigned letter thereby delaying the prosecution of the action and depriving Yu Yuk Lai of her right to speedy trial which is guaranteed by the Constitution. The argument does not persuade. In the first place, it was the accused who first filed a motion to inhibit the first judge, Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio Jr., over the objection of SP Formaran III, which motion Judge Laguio found "utterly without merit," but nonetheless granted "for the peace of mind of the accused." And, the subsequent motion to inhibit filed by SP Formaran III was not merely based on the unsigned letter, as respondent claims, but more so, from the inclination of Judge Muro to grant whatever suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai asked for from his court. Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino, when Yu Yuk Lai asked to be confined in a hospital, instead of staying in jail, Judge Muro granted her request. When she chose the Manila Doctors Hospital, instead of the Philippine General Hospital, Judge Muro granted the request. When Yu Yuk Lai requested that her one (1) week confinement be extended to one (1) month or until she was fit to be discharged, Judge Muro approved it. All these despite the vigorous opposition of the prosecution. True, every accused has the right to a speedy trial, but not at the expense of a miscarriage of justice. For, slow deliberate justice is always preferred and pursued over accelerated injustice. Indeed, the conspiracy to clear-suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai has become clearer with the recent dismissal of Judge Manuel T. Muro on 17 October 2001 for misconduct, being utterly inefficient and manifesting partiality in favor of Yu Yuk Lai. And respondent Justice has wittingly, perhaps unwittingly, become one of the co-conspirators.With regard to the findings and recommendations of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, suffice it to say that it was not the only basis of this Court in finding respondent Justice guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. In recommending the prosecution of respondent Justice Demetria, Go Teng Kok and Yu Yuk Lai, Senate Committee Report No. 396 dated 29 August 2000 was at best persuasive. Incidentally, during the Senate hearings, Go Teng Kok also categorically stated that respondent Justice was his friend even before they went to see SP Formaran III on 18 July 2000, a fact vehemently denied by respondent himself. In fine, respondent Justice has no reason to extend counseling to SP Formaran III. As a member then of the Judiciary, respondent should not act as lawyer for an accused. Neither should he teach the prosecutor what to do. He should refrain from getting himself involved in the prosecution of any case which may later be appealed to his court. Respondent denies ever making a call to CSP Zuño. This is very difficult to accept since there is sufficient reason to believe that he indeed made the call, which he could have very well done so. If respondent could personally go to the Department of Justice and argue for an accused before a prosecutor whom he claims he did not even know, what more a simple telephone call to a former subordinate. This is truly a common experience of man which can be very probable under the circumstances and may be received as credible evidence. But this Court is not pinning respondent down for the phone call alone. The series of events that transpired and the circumstances simply lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to his guilt.
The denial of respondent, which is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is plainly a negative self-serving assertion which deserves no weight in law, and cannot prevail over the positive and forthright declarations of the prosecutors who from all indications were never actuated by improper motives. As found by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino, "[n]either Zuño nor Formaran III had any motive to concoct falsehood against Justice Demetria." Respondent argues that his culpability must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We agree. But, we have often said, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such absolute certainty as to exclude the possibility of error. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In the instant case, we believe that that requisite degree of proof has been met. Finally, we quote again from the discourse of Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino that the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, including those who participate in its work, such as the prosecution arm of the Government, should be preserved at all times. "Public confidence in the judicial system is diminished when a judge, instead of preserving the integrity and independence of the Judiciary, uses his influence as a tool to derail or interfere with the regular course of a judicial proceeding for the benefit of one of the parties therein." A Member of the Court however believes that the disqualification of respondent from being appointed or reappointed to any government office, agency or instrumentality, or any government owned or controlled corporation or institution, except to the judiciary, should be lifted.
The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration except insofar as the accrued leave credits of respondent Demetrio G. Demetria were all ordered forfeited, in which case, his accrued leave credits shall be released to him in accordance with Sec. 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended.
Complainant Sylvia Santos, an aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September 2002, she asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases of complainant's friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a former employee of the Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however respondent could no longer be contacted. In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denies the charges against her and avers: In the months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of Muñoz's cases. Respondent declined; thereafter complainant started spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused; complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her. In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that “respondent be administratively penalized for the grave misconduct and dishonesty charged by complainant.”
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on Muñoz's cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainant's request for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before; however it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muñoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainant's advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim -- that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent’s refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter’s friend -- was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainant's compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent. Justice Salvador particularly observed the demeanor of complainant at the September 3, 2008 hearing. According to her, complainant, while weary of the demands entailed by the administrative case, staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same; respondent also had no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the administrative case against her. Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant's testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint. Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 claiming that there were significant omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) particularly on the statement “Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera”; such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarificatory hearing that it surfaced; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant -- that “the money was returned to me” and “ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera” -- be stricken off; and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant. In the Court's Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondent's prayer that the proposed corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her manifestation that the subject testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In this case, Justice Salvador found that substantial evidence existed to support the allegations against respondent.
Try as she might to show the implausibility of complainant's claims, respondent could not deny that she and complainant met at her office sometime in September 2002; that she and her husband knew Muñoz and associated with her on several occasions, and that it was she (respondent), being a former employee of the Supreme Court, who stood to know who Tolosa was.
But most telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muñoz's cases.
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
x x x At the start of this afternoon's proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.
x x x x
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, “Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi.” Ang sabi niya, “Sige Tita, tutulungan ko.”
Evelyn, sasabihin ko ang totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, “Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00.” Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, “Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emerita.” Unang-una iyang Emerita may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits “1,” “1-A,” “1-B” and submarkings for respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by “the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion”?
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami't nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka, ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.
The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally given by this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. As Justice Salvador's observations and findings are well supported by the records, the Court finds no reason to depart from such rule.
Indeed, complainant's claim that respondent returned the money to her was given during a clarificatory hearing. And respondent's belated objections to said testimony, through a motion submitted to the Court a month later, were accordingly noted. But respondent could not deny that she was present during the clarificatory hearing and could have very well objected to and refuted complainant's declaration on the matter. Respondent, however, did not make any objection at the time, which failure is truly damaging.
As well explained by Justice Salvador: Unrefuted by respondent, it would appear from the foregoing declarations that the return of the money complainant claims to have given the former was, in addition to the familial interests cited therefor, part of the reason the latter withdrew her complaint and acceded to the amicable settlement of the case. If it is true that she received no money in consideration of the favorable and expeditious resolution of G.R. Nos. 142676 and 146718, it necessarily and logically follows that respondent would not have returned – as in fact she would not have anything to return – said money to complainant. More so, when it is borne in mind that, as per respondent's September 20, 2005 manifestation, the aforesaid cases had reportedly been decided in favor of Emerita Muñoz. Finding no refutation of the assertion regarding respondent's return of the money and no reason to doubt the veracity thereof and/or the credibility of complainant insofar as said material fact is concerned, the undersigned is constrained to affirm the existence of a reasonable ground to believe that the former is responsible for the conduct complained of. If a criminal conviction for which the quantum of proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, may be made to rest on the testimony of a single credible witness, it stands to reason that an administrative complaint, for which only substantial evidence is required can be sustained on the strength thereof. Clearly, substantial evidence exists in this case to hold respondent liable for gross misconduct. As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while “gross,” has been defined as “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused. Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140, a judge found guilty of gross misconduct may be punished with any of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. This is respondent's first administrative offense. In view of such circumstance and the sanctions provided under Rule 140, the Court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six months to be proper in this case. As a final word, let it be stressed once again that the office of a judge is sacred and imbued with public interest. The need to maintain the public’s confidence in the judiciary cannot be made to depend solely on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. Thus, withdrawal of a complaint or desistance from a complaint will not deprive this Court of its power under the Constitution to ferret out the truth and discipline its members accordingly. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City was found guilty of gross misconduct (Santos v. Judge Arcaya – Chua, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, February 13, 2009).
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