Perjury Angelo Lopez IIIPosted on August 31, 2014 Categories Criminal, Law Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. Perjury as a Crime As a crime, perjury is penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: “Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. “Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.” Essential Elements of the Crime of Perjury Gathered from the said provision, the following are the essential elements of the crime of perjury: (a)     The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b)     The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c)     In the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (d)     The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. First Element of Perjury The first element of perjury requires that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact. For instance, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;  (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Thus, in relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations, which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. Second Element of Perjury The second element of perjury requires that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The phrase “competent person authorized to administer an oath” means a person who has a right to inquire into the questions presented to him upon matters under his jurisdiction. A lawyer, who is also a duly commissioned notary public, is a competent person authorized to administer an oath. Not all lawyers, however, are notaries public. But all notaries public are lawyers. Lawyers become notaries public only when the appropriate Regional Trial Court Executive Judge acts on their petition and issues in their favor the corresponding notarial commissions. Thus, a person who executes an affidavit containing a falsity upon a material matter before a lawyer, who is also a duly commissioned notary public, may be held liable for perjury. Third Element of Perjury The third element of perjury requires that, in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. Thus, a mere assertion of a false objective fact or a falsehood is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. “Willfully” means “intentionally,” with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact.  It is equivalent to “knowingly.” Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth.  Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. “Deliberately” implies “meditated,” as distinguished from “inadvertent acts.”  It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. A felony is committed by dolo when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases. The basis of the third element of perjury is the phrase “knowingly making untruthful statements” in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. The word “knowingly” suggests that the assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate. Hence, there is no perjury through negligence or imprudence. Fourth Element of Perjury The fourth element of perjury requires that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. For instance, in consonance with Section 1 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for offenses where a preliminary investigation is required, a criminal action is instituted by filing a complaint with the proper officer, such as a public prosecutor, for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. That complaint, in turn, must be made under oath, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “Sec. 3. Complaint defined. – A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.” Thus, a person who executes a criminal complaint containing a falsity upon a material matter may be held liable for perjury. However, in an unpublished decision (People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October 12, 1943) it was held that the word “requires” in the phrase “in cases in which the law so requires” (in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code) may be given the meaning of “authorizes.” Hence, the fourth element may be read “that the sworn statement (or affidavit) containing the falsity is authorized by law.” Thus, even if there is no law, requiring the statement to be made under oath, as long as it is made for a legal purpose, it is sufficient. Policy of the Law on Perjury Of great importance is the policy of the law on perjury, which the Supreme Court laid down in People v. Cainglet (G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966). In that case, the Supreme Court emphatically stressed that every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not. [References: Antonio B. Monfort III, et. al. v. Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, et. al., G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012, Celsa P. Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, et. al., G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005, Page 275 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, citing U.S. v. Go Chanco, 23 Phil. 641, Philip S. Yu v. Hernan G. Lim, G.R. No. 182291, September 22, 2010, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, Page 276 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, Section 1 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Page 277 of the law book titled, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two (Articles 114-367), Fourteenth Edition (Revised 1998) by Luis B. Reyes, People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October 12, 1943, People v. Cainglet (G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966), and Alfonso C. Choa v. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003, citing People v. Cainglet, G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1966]

21ST PERSUASIVE APPEAL_3JUNE16_MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE IS BOUNDED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

scroll image credit: www.clipartbest.com A CONTINUING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT PROVISION SINCE THE 1980'S TO 2001 THE BASIS WHY TASREA ALLOWED THE JETTY OPERATIONS TO BE CONTRACTED OUT AND NOT ON ACCOUNT OF QUIROZ'S DECEITFUL ALIBIS.. JUNE 3, 2016 SALUTATION Dear Chief Justice Sereno, et al: MESSAGE PREFATORY 1 It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employers judgment in the conduct of his business. The Labor Code and its implementing rules do not vest in the labor arbiters nor in the different divisions of the NLRC nor in the courts managerial authority.[16] The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees has been traditionally identified as a management prerogative subject to limitations found in the law, a collective bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair play and justice. This is a function associated with the employers inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.[17] REGALADO, J.: [16] Almodiel vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100641, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 341. [17] Abbot Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713. A Collective Bargaining Agreement is the law between the parties It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.[16] We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda: A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. [17] Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.[18]  [16] Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165486, May 31, 2006, 490 SCRA 61, 72. [17] G.R. No. 145561, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 187, 190-191. [18] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1370. 2 ARTICLE 111 BILL OF RIGHTS Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws,[17] and to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.[18]Substantial impairment as conceived in relation to impairment of contracts has been explained in the case of Clemons v. Nolting,[19] which stated that: a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.  Excerpts from the case of Clemons v. Nolting shown next: G.R. No. L-17959             January 24, 1922 ROBERT S. CLEMONS, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM T. NOLTING, as Auditor of the Government of the Philippine Islands, respondent. Contracts are made for things, not names or sounds, and the obligation of the contract arises from its terms and the means which the law affords for its enforcement. Under the Civil Code the contract constitutes the law of the parties unless it violates some provision of law or public policy. The parties themselves make the law by which they shall be governed, and it is the business of the courts to see that the parties to a legal contract comply with its terms. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. An interference with the terms of a legal contract by legislation is unwarranted and illegal. A contract is not fulfilled by the delivery of one thing which is different from the thing the contract provides for. Words in contracts are to be given the meaning which they were understood to have by the parties at the time of the making of the contract. There cannot exist in this jurisdiction one law for debtors and another law for creditors. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our Government amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation, and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; it may declare new crimes and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; it may command what is right and forbid what is wrong, but it cannot change innocence into guilt and punish innocence as a crime, or violate the rights of an antecedent lawful private contract or the right of private property. (Calder vs. Bul, 3 Dallas, 388.) The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred, and that includes contractual rights. (Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters, 657.) DISCUSSION The union, TASREA,  and Shell had series of  collective bargaining agreements since 1980's to the present, each contained in it Job Security provision to wit : 2001 CBA  Article XIV Section 3_ CONTRACTING OUT "TASREA recognizes the right of the company to contract out work. However. no employee shall suffer loss of employment on account of contract out work.".[18]  This provision means that the union will not interfere or contest  with the right of the company to contract out work up to the extent that even jobs which the union members were normally doing were likewise, been contracted out,  like the jetty operations which 10 job positions  together with several instrument and electrical technicians positions been lost to contractors.  The union, though it wanted to  file opposition about our jobs being contracted out, could not do so,  simply because management assured no one in our ranks would suffer loss of employment in consonance with the job security provision of the collective bargaining agreement, and not that JETTY OPERATIONS :NEVER A  PART OF THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE REFINERY nor JETTY OPERATIONS : THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND PERSONS OF THOSE WORKING AT THE JETTY as Atty. Raul Quiroz deceitfully alleged.  The union merely dutifully abided by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. JETTY OPERATIONS:NEVER A  PART OF THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE REFINERY_THIS IS A LIE. Atty. Quiroz et al lied on stating that : "the union agreed to the contracting out of the jetty operations because it was never a part of the regular business of the refinery. "  If it was never a part of the regular business of the refinery why should the company still asked and mentioned and asserted that the union agreed with it?  Why bother sought for the union agreeing to it if it were not part of the regular business of the refinery?  Moreover,  refinery operations involve receiving raw materials (crude in bulk quantities) from ship tankers and loading finished products, likewise to tankers via the jetties  SHOWING THE JETTY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE REFINERY OPERATIONS.  See 44.1 AC-10084 defense argument JETTY OPERATIONS : THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND PERSONS OF THOSE WORKING AT THE JETTY._THIS IS A LIE This alibi was a lie.  The truth of the matter was, the issue, handing over the jetty operations to contractor operators,  did not translate into a full blown conflict between the union and the company due to the fact that the union was obliged to honor what was embodied in the CBA that :  TASREA acknowledges the right of the company   to contract out work.  However, no employee shall suffer loss of employment  on account of the contracted out work. The company on their part gave the assurance that no employee shall suffer loss of employment on account of the contracted out work.   In other words, the union was bounded by the spirit of the agreement thus the union on her part allowed that jetty operations, AMONG OTHER JOBS,  be contracted out WITH EXPECTATION AND ASSURANCE THAT THE COMPANY SHALL HONOR THE SAME TO THE EFFECT THAT AS LONG AS THE JETTY AND OTHER JOBS ARE BEING CONTRACTED OUT, NO EMPLOYEE SHALL SUFFER LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT.. And   assuming without agreeing, for the sake of argument, this threat  alibi was true,  This alibi would not help the company MOVE OUT OF THE CONTROVERSY but rather put them on a WORST perspective due to the fact that the company merely shifted the risk of the threat from the union member operators to the  contractor operators. Safety and security considerations must be must be common to all. It is not fair on part of the contractor operators to be subjected to threats  that management as per their assessment were existing while saving union member operator from it.  If there was really a threat to safety and security, then this is an action applicable to safety department to address by  imposing strict security measures up to the extent of asking police assistance when necessary and not by merely shifting the threat from one group of workers to another group. THEY ARE BOTH PEOPLE HAVING COMMON SAFETY AND SECURITY NEEDS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE ACCORDED COMMON SAFETY AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. This is ridiculous.  This did not make sense.  As I personally observed, it did not alter or change that threat.  Everything else was the same. What significantly changed as I happened to talk to these contractors,   was the  much  lower pay and less benefits  these contractor operators were receiving in exchange for their services. Contracting out the jetty operations and other electrical and instruments technicians jobs are  continuing processes up to the time when an old plant was closed.  At this point it was time for the company to reciprocate obligation mandated by the job security provision of the CBA as the union been faithful to it a couple of years back when 10 jetty operators position were contracted out.. Instead of faithfully performing  obligations by reciprocity under the CBA , the company opted to terminate employment of three union members. It is important to note that there were 10 employees that were terminated.  Among the 10 employees terminated only 3 are union members and 7 were executives and volunteered to be terminated. Among the three union members, two volunteered, leaving Antonio Buensuceso, alone contesting his termination invoking among others, the job security provision of the CBA.  On this case, the company proceeded to terminate Buensuceso, disregarding the existing CBA between them. On this regard the termination of my employment clearly is violative of the job security provision of the collective bargaining agreement-contract existing between union and the company and depicted an invalid use of management prerogative ; hence, illegal. I am sending you this message as a matter of 21ST PERSUASIVE APPEAL for you to consider review of cases GR-183273 and AC-10084. Yours faithfully, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr. additional note See 44.1 AC-10084 defense argument below:

3JUNE16_50TH TIME_SHELL ROBBED EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PAY

SHELL ROBBED 

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PAY

A case of David vs. Goliath by Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.

image credit:david-and-goliath-shane-robinson.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation robbed employee's retirement pay by circumventing the Retirement Pay Law, while ranking Supreme Court of the Philippines personnel, the PIO chief, is delaying and preventing due course to its recovery, whereby:

 NUMBER 1. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS   CONSTITUTING CORRUPT PRACTICES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER RA 3019_ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

REPUBLIC ACT 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party (myself, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.) including the Government, or giving any private party (PSPC, SHELL) any unwarranted benefits, (NON-PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT PAY) advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative (ATTY. THEODORE TE, functions) or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices (Atty. Theodore Te, an officer of one offices of the Supreme Court, the PIO) or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

NUMBER 2. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS WHICH OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE OR TEND TO OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE THE SUCCESSFUL APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS BY VIOLATING WILLFULLY,  DELIBERATELY THE PROVISION OF THE LAW PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1829 SECTION 1(e)

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829 PENALIZING 

OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND 

PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

MALACAÑANG
M a n i l a

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829

PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them;

WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

NUMBER 3. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS  WILLFULLY,  DELIBERATELY in violation of RULE VI, of the  Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) 

RESPONSE TO REQUESTS AND PETITIONS MANDATED BY THE Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713)

(Republic Act No. 6713) RULE 6 _Duties of public officials and employees

Section 3. In case of written requests, petitions or motions, sent by means of letters, telegrams, or the like, the official or employee in charge shall act on the same within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, provided that:

(a) If the communication is within the jurisdiction of the office or agency, the official or employee must:

(1) Write a note or letter of acknowledgement where the matter is merely routinary or the action desired may be acted upon in the ordinary course of business of the department, office or agency, specifying the date when the matter will be disposed of and the name of the official or employee in charge thereof.

NUMBER 4. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS  WILLFULLY,  DELIBERATELY in violation of ARTICLE XI SECTION 1 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, to wit: 
Article XI section 1 of the Philippine constitution

ARTICLE XI : Accountability of Public Officers

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

      TO THE JUSTICES OF THE                 SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

IN RE : AC NUMBER 10084 

AND GR NUMBER 183273

At this point, AC NUMBER 10084 and GR NUMBER 183273 by virtue of the evidences showing prima facie proofs of miscarriage of justice are needed to be reviewed and accorded proper adjudication.  Farther neglect through your gross inexcusable negligence will cause irreparable damage not only to the Filipino peoples' interest and mine but most importantly to your own interest  in keeping legitimacy of holding your position as Justices of the Supreme Court.  Your Honors, kindly correct the administrative and judicial errors you have committed while there is still time. When there is conflict between the Constitution or Law versus the Supreme Court internal rules, the Constitution and/or the law prevail.  Your Honors, with all due respect, please be reminded that the discretionary power in your possession  is for the advancement of justice not for the promotion of injustice .
  
Kindly, show us your people that the Supreme Court is not really composed of people and Justices beholden to Big Money interest,  pretending to be deaf and blind to the plight of the oppressed and the defenseless. Your Honors, please scrape the hardened calluses from your eyes...see your people, hear what they are saying...your people suffer from injustice...they cry for justice then deliver justice to them....not tomorrow but now. 

  

Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa

THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE.