G.R. No. 165594 FRANCISCO SORIANO, JR., Petitioner, April 23, 2007

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 165594             April 23, 2007 FRANCISCO SORIANO, JR., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Respondents. D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Francisco Soriano Jr. seeks to set aside the Decision dated 29 April 20042 and Resolution dated 4 October 20043 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75152, affirming the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 20 August 20024 and 28 October 2002,5 respectively, in NLRC-CA No. 024050-2000. In its Decision and Resolution, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (Labor Arbiter Lustria) dated 23 March 2000 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-05259-966 dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Incorporated. The factual antecedents of the petition at bar are as follows: In 1980, petitioner and certain individuals namely Sergio Benjamin (Benjamin), Maximino Gonzales (Gonzales), and Noel Apostol (Apostol) were employed by the respondent as Switchman Helpers in its Tondo Exchange Office (TEO). After participating in several trainings and seminars, petitioner, Benjamin, and Gonzales were promoted as Switchmen. Apostol, on the other hand, was elevated to the position of Frameman. One of their duties as Switchmen and Frameman was the manual operation and maintenance of the Electronic Mechanical Device (EMD) of the TEO.7 In November 1995, respondent PLDT implemented a company-wide redundancy program.8 In its "Notice of Separation Due to Redundancy" dated 27 November 1995 to the Director of the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR),9 respondent PLDT cited the following reasons for the aforesaid redundancy program: a) Technological changes where new technologies necessitate reduction in workforce, e.g., conversion of electro-mechanical switches; outmoded electronic switches to modern digital switches. b) Position declared redundant due to collapsing/merging of functions where the required number of personnel became less, i.e. rehoming of toll centers or centralization of toll centers. c) Non-replacement of function upon retirement of executive where attached staffs with the executive are no longer needed – Staff Assistant, Secretary, Clerk. d) Process Improvements and Automation of functions which render the positions as redundant since the new process or Automation require less personnel. e) Functions or positions which are affected adversely by market forces, thereby necessitating reduction of current workforce to match the reduction of workload, i.e., Traffic – due to decreasing number of handled calls. Subsequently, the respondent PLDT gave separate letters dated 15 July 1996 to petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol informing them that their respective positions were deemed redundant due to the above-cited reasons and that their services will be terminated on 16 August 1996.10 They requested the respondent PLDT for transfer to some vacant positions but their requests were denied since all positions were already filled up. Hence, on 16 August 1996, respondent PLDT dismissed the four from employment.11 On 20 August 1996, Benjamin received an amount of P315,435.04 from the respondent PLDT as separation pay,12while Apostol and Gonzales received on 2 September 1996 their separation pay from the respondent PLDT in the amounts of P486,484.95 and P472,897.08, respectively.13 Likewise, petitioner received on 21 October 1996 an amount of P644,194.64 from the respondent PLDT as his separation pay.14 All four of them executed a document entitled, "Receipt, Release and Quitclaim" in favor of the respondent PLDT;15 they, however, placed a note of "Under Protest" beside their signatures in the said document.16 Thereafter, petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol filed a joint complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent PLDT.17 On 23 March 2000, Labor Arbiter Lustria rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. He stated that the respondent PLDT legitimately exercised its management prerogative in terminating the services of petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol, on the ground of a valid redundancy program. He was also convinced that the respondent PLDT complied with the requirements for dismissing an employee for redundancy under Article 283 of the Labor Code.18 Further, Labor Arbiter Lustria opined that respondent PLDT’s redundancy program was effected in good faith as the reduction of the latter’s employees was brought about by its adoption of the latest communication technology equipment which can be operated by computers alone. This undertaking was also done pursuant to the demand of the public for clearer signal, faster service and digital features. He found no ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the respondent PLDT in implementing the redundancy program and noted that petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales and Apostol had already received their respective separation pay and had executed release and quitclaim in favor of respondent PLDT. In conclusion, Labor Arbiter Lustria held: Finally, we have often stressed that it has always been an avowed policy of this Arbitration Branch that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the working man’s welfare should be the paramount and primordial consideration. In protecting the working class, however, we could not simply close our eyes to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. This, is so, for while we favor the cause of the working class in his conflict with management, we likewise have to consider the rights and interest of the employers, which are equally entitled to legal protection. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.19 Petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol appealed to the NLRC. On 20 August 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Lustria. It ruled that the findings, conclusions and legal bases of Labor Arbiter Lustria were supported by the evidence on record. In parting, it ruled: Needless to state, not having been illegally dismissed, as comprehensively discussed above, Complainants-Appellants are therefore not entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority right and privileges and to payment of full back wages. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is sustained in toto.20 Petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision but the same was denied for lack of compelling reason in the Resolution dated 28 October 2002. Thereafter, the four dismissed employees assailed the NLRC Decision and Resolution, dated 20 August 2002 and 28 October 2002, respectively, via a Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. On 29 April 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed Decision and Resolution. Pertinent portions of the said decision read: At any rate, grave abuse of discretion, the ground invoked to support the petition at bench, has been defined as "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, x x x where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not in fact sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; (the) abuse must be grave. Noting that no such abuse of discretion as defined attended the assailed resolutions, We have no choice but to dismiss the petition. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.21 Petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 4 October 2004. On 24 November 2004, petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, dated 29 April 2004 and 4 October 2004, respectively. In our Resolution dated 24 January 2005, we denied the Petition for failure of Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol to sign the attached verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, thus: In accordance with Rule 45 and other related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On the basis thereof, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari dated 24 November 2004 assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals for petitioners’ failure to submit a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 4 (e), Rule 45 in relation to Section 5, Rule 7, Section 2, Rule 42, and Sections 4 and 5 (d), Rule 56, the attached verification and certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by only one (1) of four (4) petitioners.22 On 28 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging therein that: Since the cause of action of each petitioner is independent of the other three, petitioner SORIANO, JR. could validly proceed with his own petition for review on certiorari without the intervention of his co-petitioners. Consequently, he should not be prejudiced by the failure of his co-petitioners to verify the petition and submit a valid certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner SORIANO, JR. signed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping in the petition for review on certiorari. Hence, as far as he is concerned, his petition has complied with Section 4 (e), Rule 45 in relation to Section 5, Rule 7, Section 2, Rule 42, and Sections 4 and 5 (d), Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition in regard to him should not have been dismissed by this Honorable Court.23 Hence, we reinstated the Petition but excluded Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol as petitioners.24 Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE IN REFUSING TO REVIEW THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE NLRC THAT PETITIONER WAS LAWFULLY TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S ACCEPTANCE OF SEPARATION BENEFITS AMOUNTS TO A WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF HIS DISMISSAL.25 Apropos the first issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals may review the findings of fact of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 even if the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not conflict with each other; that the reliance of the Court of Appeals on the case of Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission26 was contrary to law and jurisprudence; that our ruling in Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit: "Only when the factual findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are clearly in conflict with each other is this Court behooved to give utmost attention to and thoroughly scrutinize the records of the case, more particularly the evidence presented, to arrive at a correct decision," is not absolute; that the aforecited ruling is only a general rule and is only binding if the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence; and that in the case of Maya Farms Employees Organization v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 this Court held that findings of fact of the NLRC, even though these do not conflict with the findings of the Labor Arbiter, may be reviewed on certiorari when these findings are made in disregard of the evidence on record.28 We reject these contentions. As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.29 In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in limiting its determination to the issue of whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, and in refusing to review the factual findings of the said administrative body, since its factual findings and conclusions are anchored on substantial evidence. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals all found that substantial evidence supports the absence of illegal dismissal in the present case. Article 283 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may dismiss from work an employee by reason of redundancy. The same provision also states the procedural requirements for the validity of the dismissal, viz: ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereof shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. (Emphases supplied.) In upholding the legality of petitioner’s dismissal from work, the NLRC relied on the documents submitted by the respondent PLDT showing compliance with the requirements abovestated, to wit: 1) a letter notifying the Director of the DOLE-NCR of the impending termination from work of the petitioner by reason of redundancy and stating the grounds/reasons for the implementation of the redundancy program;30 2) a letter apprising the petitioner of his dismissal from employment due to redundancy;31 3) a receipt certifying that the petitioner had already received his separation pay from the respondent PLDT;32 4) a release/waiver/quitclaim executed by the petitioner in favor of the respondent PLDT;33 and 5) affidavits executed by the officers of the respondent PLDT explaining the reasons and necessities for the implementation of the redundancy program.34 Petitioner failed to question, impeach or refute the existence, genuineness, and validity of these documents. It is clear that the foregoing documentary evidence constituted substantial evidence to support the findings of Labor Arbiter Lustria and the NLRC that petitioner’s employment was terminated by respondent PLDT due to a valid or legal redundancy program since substantial evidence merely refers to that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.35 With regard to petitioner’s allegation that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the validity of his dismissal from work, it should be borne in mind that an act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility.36 As earlier discussed, the ruling of the NLRC was premised on substantial evidence comprising of documentary proofs submitted by the respondent PLDT showing compliance with the requirements of law for terminating petitioner’s employment due to redundancy. This obviously negates any capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of judgment of the NLRC. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC for promulgating its Decision dated 20 August 2002. Petitioner’s reliance on the case of Maya Farms Employees Organization v. National Labor Relations Commission37is misplaced. We did not make a categorical statement in the said case that the Court of Appeals may review the findings of fact of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court even if the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not conflict with each other. What we stated therein was that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.38 In Maya Farms, this Court deemed it necessary to look into the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the latter. Even then, we found substantial evidence to support the NLRC decision and, thus, we held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the latter. Moreover, the circumstances in Maya Farms are different from the instant case. The facts and issues of Maya Farms were initially referred to the Secretary of the DOLE which, subsequently, endorsed these to the NLRC. Thereafter, the said case was immediately elevated to this Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the present case was initially referred to the Labor Arbiter, whose findings were affirmed by the NLRC. From the NLRC, the instant case was appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Finding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Thereafter, this case was brought before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, not of fact.39 Nevertheless, this Court may review the facts where: (1) the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the other, are inconsistent on material and substantial points; (2) the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are capricious and arbitrary; and (3) the Court of Appeals’ findings that are premised on a supposed absence of evidence are in fact contradicted by the evidence on record.40 None of the foregoing exceptions to our limited power to review the facts is present in the case at bar. Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that there was no substantial evidence showing that the position of Switchman had become redundant; that the affidavits of the respondent PLDT’s officers have no probative value and should not have been considered by the NLRC because the said officers are not competent to testify on the technical aspects and effects of respondent PLDT’s adoption of new technology; that the existence of redundancy was belied by the respondent PLDT’s acts of employing outside plant personnel as Switchmen and Framemen, and of hiring contractual employees to perform the functions of Switchmen; and that the respondent PLDT did not present proof of the method and criteria it used in determining the Switchman to be terminated from work.41 Petitioner further avers that he passed several qualifying exams and received awards for outstanding work; that by reason of his qualifications and exemplary work, he should have been among the last Switchmen to be laid-off; that the respondent PLDT violated its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner’s union, Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, when it terminated his job; that the respondent PLDT did not undertake sincere efforts and actual measures to avoid loss of employment due to its adoption of new technology; that at the time he was dismissed from work, there were 163 vacant positions for which he was qualified; that he timely applied for transfer to these positions; and that the respondent PLDT denied his applications without showing any evidence that the said positions were already filled up.42 Redundancy exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.43 The records show that respondent PLDT had sufficiently established the existence of redundancy in the position of Switchman. In his affidavit dated 27 September 1999, Roberto D. Lazam (Lazam), Senior Manager of GMM Network Surveillance Division of respondent PLDT, explained: 17. The work, on the other hand, of all the complainants as switchmen is to MAINTAIN ALL the strowger switches in an exchange. The exchange is the center of an area’s telephone network. PLDT, thus, have a Sta. Mesa Exchange that houses the switchtrains servicing the Sta. Mesa, Manila and its neighboring areas while it has exchanges in other areas like the Quezon City exchange, Parañaque, etc., that house the switchtrains of the telephones in the said respective territories. 18. To maintain a single strowger switch, the following are performed according to a regular schedule: a. Spring Gauging – it is the adjusting of stationary springs to ensure that they open enough to break circuits when they should, and so "stationary" springs, "follow" moving springs to exert pressure in break contracts when the relay is unoperated, and makes contact when operated. b. Margining – it is the measuring of moving spring tension by checking response of the armature and specific electrical limits. It measures the total mechanical resistance to the operation of the armature due to the tension of the springs. c. Stroke – is the normal armature air gap and is adjusted by bending the armature backstop. d. Routine – it is a periodic check of the functioning of telephone apparatus to detect faults. The foregoing are some of the duties and work of a switchman. Considering the number of strowger switches in a single switchtrain and considering further the number of switchtrains in an exchange (bearing in mind the ratio of 30 switchtrains is to 200 subsribers), certainly, the use of a step-by-step automatic telephone system necessitates intensive maintenance costs and procedures, not to mention the big number of people needed to perform the maintenance work. 19. With the advent, however, of new technology that is, feature for feature, more advanced than the step-by-step automatic telephone system, the company decided to upgrade its system and abandon the use of the old system. 20. One of the features of the digital technology is that it does not make use of switches every step of connection. Instead, a single card studded with microchips is issued for each telephone number so that if a caller wishes to call another, the microchips in the assigned card do all the work and in a speed of light gets in contact with the microchips of the called party’s card. These "cards" are stored in a "bookshelf like" structure and practically requires zero maintenance because if a card or a chip in the card is defective, a computer that monitors the entire exchange will automatically inform the computer operator of a defect, the card involved, its exact location and the specific "bookshelf." All the computer operator has to do then is to rise up from his chair, proceed to the computer identified bookshelf, locate the card, pull out the card from the "bookshelf", throw it in the waste-can, and put in a new card programmed of course with the telephone number. Programming a card, upon the other hand, is a fairly simple procedure that it is almost similar to the programming of the PIN number of an ATM card. 21. With the utter simplicity of the above system, albeit ultimately hi-tech, a lot of tedious tasks have been done away with. Where before a big number of switchmen were required to keep the system in shape and where before every strowger switch was scrutinized and measured, the new system requires only one human being to ensure that an exchange servicing a million subscribers is in tip top shape. To illustrate, consider an exchange serving 50,000 subscribers. Such an exchange, using the old system, would need 100 personnel working in 3 8-hour shifts to perform preventive and corrective switch maintenance. On the other hand, an exchange using the new system would need only one man working from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. to take care of switch maintenance. 22. In addition to the simplicity of maintenance another advantage of the digital technology is the added services never before known by ordinary Filipinos. These are to name a few: (a) The call waiting feature (b) Terminal Portability (c) Direct dialing long distance features (International and Domestic) (d) Do not disturb feature (e) Automatic Recall (f) Redial gadgets (g) Call forwarding facilities (h) Conference call capacity 23. The new technology simply rendered the position of switchmen redundant. And since there is no other position available and suited for their qualifications, the company had no other option but to terminate their employment under a redundancy program. 24. With the features of the new system, it certainly cannot be said that the company’s decision and implementation of the redundancy program was arbitrary or whimsical.44 It is evident from the foregoing facts that respondent PLDT’s utilization of high technology equipment in its operation such as computers and digital switches necessarily resulted in the reduction of the demand for the services of a Switchman since computers and digital switches can aptly perform the function of several Switchmen. Indubitably, the position of Switchman has become redundant. As to whether Lazam was competent to testify on the effects of respondent PLDT’s adoption of new technology vis-à-vis the petitioner’s position of Switchman, the records show that Lazam was highly qualified to do so. He is a licensed electrical engineer and has been employed by the respondent PLDT since 1971. He was a Senior Manager for Switching Division in several offices of the respondent PLDT, and had attended multiple training programs on Electronic Switching Systems in progressive countries. He was also a training instructor of Switchmen in the respondent’s office.45 The fact that respondent PLDT hired contractual employees after implementing its redundancy program does not necessarily negate the existence of redundancy. As amply stated by the respondent PLDT, such hiring was intended solely for winding up operations using the old system. The respondent PLDT, as employer, has the recognized right and prerogative to select the persons to be hired and to designate the work as well as the employee or employees to perform it.46 This includes the right of the respondent PLDT to determine the employees to be retained or discharged and who among the applicants are qualified and competent for a vacant position. The rationale for this principle is that respondent PLDT is in the best position to ascertain what is proper for the advancement of its interest. Thus, this Court cannot interfere in the wisdom and soundness of the respondent PLDT’s decision as to who among the Switchmen should be retained or discharged or who should be transferred to vacant positions, as long as such was made in good faith and not for the purpose of curbing the rights of an employee.47 Since the respondent PLDT determined that petitioner’s services are no longer necessary either as a Switchman or in any other position, and such determination was made in good faith and in furtherance of its business interest, the petitioner’s contention that he should be the last switchman to be laid-off by reason of his qualifications and outstanding work must fail. Coming now to the third issue, petitioner asseverates that his acceptance of separation pay from the respondent PLDT does not bar the filing of his complaint for illegal dismissal against the latter, nor does it imply that he had already waived his right to question the validity of his dismissal; that he accepted the separation pay only after the lapse of two months from the time he filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent PLDT; that he had no intention of accepting the separation pay; that he was only forced to accept the separation pay when his parent fell ill and, thus, needed a large amount of money to cover the expenses for treatment; and that he was compelled to execute a quitclaim in favor of respondent PLDT since this was the only way he could avail himself of the necessary amount for the treatment of his parent.48 Generally, deeds of release, waiver or quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy.49 Where, however, the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.50 The requisites for a valid quitclaim are: 1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; 2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and 3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.51 It cannot be gainfully said that the petitioner did not fully understand the consequences of signing the "Receipt, Release, and Quitclaim" dated 15 August 1996. Petitioner is not an illiterate person who needs special protection. He held responsible positions in the office of the respondent PLDT and had attended and passed various training courses for his position. It is thus assumed that he comprehended the contents of the "Receipt, Release, and Quitclaim" which he signed on 15 August 1996. There is also no showing that the execution thereof was tainted with deceit or coercion. By his own admission, petitioner signed the quitclaim voluntarily, compelled by personal circumstances, rather than by respondent PLDT. He had received his separation pay and benefited therefrom. Certainly, it would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the petitioner if he is allowed to question the legality of his dismissal from work. Further, the petitioner received separation pay from the respondent PLDT, the amount of which was more than the amount required under Article 283 of the Labor Code.52 Indeed, there was a credible and reasonable consideration for his separation from work. Given the foregoing circumstances, the "Receipt, Release, and Quitclaim" dated 15 August 1996 should be considered as legal and binding on petitioner. It is settled that a legitimate waiver which represents a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker’s claim should be respected as the law between the parties.53 Thus, the petitioner is bound by the "Receipt, Release and Quitclaim" dated 15 August 1996 and, as such, he is already precluded from assailing the validity of his dismissal. Finally, it should be noted that the ruling of Labor Arbiter Lustria sustaining the validity of petitioner’s dismissal from work by reason of a valid redundancy program was affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. As heretofore discussed, their findings were predicated on the evidence on records and prevailing jurisprudence. It is well-established that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, when in absolute agreement, are accorded not only respect but even finality as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.54 We find no compelling reason to depart from this principle. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75152 dated 29 April 2004 and 4 October 2004, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Asscociate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 9-25. 2 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 29-36. 3 Id. at 37-38. 4 Penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo , concurring; id. at 92-110. 5 Id. at 117-118. 6 Id. at 67-78. 7 Id. at 11-13. 8 Id. at 143-144. 9 Id. at 195-196. 10 Id. at 199-202. 11 Id. at 49-62. 12 Id. at 203-205. 13 Id. at 206-211. 14 Id. at 212-214. 15 Id. at 203, 206, 209 and 212. 16 Id. 17 NLRC records, pp. 1-4. 18 ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereof shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. (Emphases supplied.) 19 Rollo, p. 78. 20 Id. at 109-110. 21 Id. at 35-36. 22 Id. at 131. 23 Id. at 133. 24 Id. at 138. 25 Id. at 358. 26 G.R. No. 131653, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 204. 27 G.R. No. 106256, 28 December 1994, 239 SCRA 508, 512. 28 Rollo, pp. 359-360. 29 Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman, G.R. No. 154368, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 382, 395-396. 30 Rollo, pp. 195-196. 31 Id. at 202. 32 Id. at 213-214. 33 Id. at 212. 34 Id. at 252-262. 35 Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation v. Vicente, G.R. No. 142759, 10 November 2004, 441 SCRA 574, 581. 36 Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142612, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 106, 113-114. 37 Supra note 27. 38 Id. at 512. 39 Usero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 352, 358. 40 Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 159170, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 686, 693. 41 Rollo, pp. 360-362. 42 Id. at 363-367. 43 San Miguel Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. Nos. 168194 and 168603, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 604, 614. 44 Id. at 254-256. 45 Id. at 252-253. 46 San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v. Ople, G.R. No. 53515, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 25, 27. 47 Id. at 28; See also Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 156658, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 270, 274. 48 Rollo, pp. 367-368. 49 Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 439. 50 Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149793, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 280, 295. 51 Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman, supra note 29 at 397. 52 Rollo, p. 212. 53 Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 664, 680. 54 Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154376, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 559, 566.

SALVADOR A. PLEYTO_G.R. No. 169982_November 23, 2007

THIRD DIVISION SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, Petitioner, - versus- PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (PNP-CIDG), Respondent. G.R. No. 169982 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 23, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the dismissal from service of petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto after being found guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Decision,[2] dated 27 May 2004, in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision,[3] dated 20 July 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. The present Petition stems from a Complaint,[4] dated 28 July 2003, filed by respondent Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), through its Director, Eduardo S. Matillano, with the Office of the Ombudsman, which charges petitioner and the rest of his family as follows: The undersigned Director of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group is hereby filing complaints for Violation of RA 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer) in relation to Section 8, RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, Section 8(a) of RA 6713, (Code of Ethical Standard for Public official and employee) and Section 7 of RA 3019 (Statement of Assets and Liabilities) and for violation of Article 171 para 4, RPC (Perjury/Falsification of Public Official Documents) against the following: 1.      USEC SALVADOR A. PLEYTO- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City; 2.      MIGUELA PLEYTO (Wife)- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City; 3.      SALVADOR G. PLEYTO, JR.,- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City; 4.      MARY GRACE PLETYO- # 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City; and 5.      RUSSEL PLEYTO- 64 P. Santiago Street, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[5] The said Complaint was based on the investigation/inquiry on the alleged lavish lifestyle and nefarious activities of certain personnel of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) conducted by a team, composed of Atty. Virgilio T. Pablico (Atty. Pablico) and Crime Investigator II Dominador D. Ellazar, Jr. (InvestigatorEllazar, Jr.) of the PNP-CIDG, together with investigating officers from other government agencies. Petitioner, then serving as a DPWH Undersecretary, was one of the subjects of the investigating team since he reportedly amassed unexplained wealth. Investigating officers, Atty. Pablico and Investigator Ellazar, Jr., executed a Joint Affidavit,[6] essentially stating that: (1) petitioner and the rest of his family accumulated numerous real properties in Bulacan, other than their newly renovated residence in Quezon City; (2) petitioner did not honestly fill out his Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALNs) for the years 2001 and 2002 for he failed to declare therein all of his and his wifes real and personal properties, the true value thereof, and their business interests; (3) petitioner and his family also took frequent foreign trips from 1993 to 2002; and (4) the properties and foreign trips of petitioner and his family are grossly disproportionate to petitioners income. The Investigating Panel from the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau A (PIAB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman, tasked to evaluate the Complaint against petitioner and his family, issued a Report on 9 September 2003, recommending that the said Complaint be docketed as separate administrative and criminal cases. Pursuant thereto, the administrative complaint was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0347-1, while the criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-05130-1. It is the administrative complaint, OMB-C-A-03-0347-1, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, which presently concerns this Court.[7] In its initial evaluation of the numerous pieces of evidence which were attached to the Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Order, dated 25 September 2003,[8]found that the evidence warranted the preventive suspension of petitioner for six months without pay pending the conduct of the administrative proceedings against him.The said Preventive Suspension Order shall be deemed immediately effective and executory. The petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 79516, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for the nullification of the Preventive Suspension Order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman.However, the said Preventive Suspension Order had already lapsed even before the Court of Appeals could resolve the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79516, thus, rendering the same moot and academic. In the meantime, petitioner, his wife, and his children filed their respective Counter-Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits before the Office of the Ombudsman, presenting the following defenses: (1) petitioner admits ownership of the real properties identified in the Complaint but alleges that they were acquired by way of foreclosure or dacion en pago in the course of his wifes lending business in Sta. Maria, Bulacan; (2) petitioner is not solely dependent on his salary since his wife has been operating several businesses in Bulacan, including lending, piggery, and pawnshop, for the last 25 years; (3) his children are not financially dependent on petitioner and his wife, but are full-fledged entrepreneurs and professionals; and (4) the computation of their travel expenses is exaggerated and inaccurate since most of petitioners trips were sponsored by foreign and local organizations, his wifes trips were promotional travel packages to Asian destinations, and his childrens trips were at their own expense. On 28 June 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated its Decision[9] in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, dismissing petitioner from service. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, is hereby found guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and DISHONESTY and is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The Honorable Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways, Port Area, Manila, is hereby directed to implement this Order immediately upon receipt hereof and to promptly inform this Office of compliance therewith.[10] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order[11] dated 12 October 2004. Petitioner then assailed before the Court of Appeals the Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12 October 2004, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. Petitioner prayed to the appellate court that: 1.      Upon filing of the petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be immediately issued directing the Office of the Ombudsman, its officials and agents, or persons acting for and on it [sic] behalf, including the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways from implementing the assailed Decision of the Ombudsman dated 28 June 2004 and its Order dated 12 October 2004. 2.      After hearing on the merits, that judgment be rendered nullifying the assailed Decision of the Ombudsman dated June 28, 2004 and Order dated October 12, 2004 in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I. Other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.[12] On 5 November 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the implementation of the assailed Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing petitioner from service and directed the PNP-CIDG, the named respondent in petitioners Petition for Review, to file its Comment thereto. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the PNP-CIDG, requested an extension of 30 days, or until 28 December 2004, within which to file its Comment on the Petition. However, even before the OSG could file its Comment, the Office of the Ombudsman filed its own Comment (with Motions to Intervene; Admit Comment; and Recall Temporary Restraining Order) on 29 December 2004. It sought leave from the Court of Appeals to adduce pertinent facts and arguments to show that it acted with due process and impartiality, and relied only on the evidence on record in adjudging petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Office of the Ombudsman insisted that it has been shown by overwhelming evidence, as well as by petitioners own admissions in his counter-affidavit and other pleadings before the Office of the Ombudsman and his Petition before the Court of Appeals, that petitioner committed gross dishonesty for amassing wealth grossly disproportionate to his known lawful income, and refusing to fully declare many of his other properties. Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman submits that the administrative penalty of dismissal from the service imposed on petitioner stands on solid legal and factual grounds, which should be accorded weight and respect, if not finality, by the appellate court. Petitioner promptly filed a Reply Ad Cautelam (To Ombudsmans Comment) with Supplemental Plea. In addition to opposing the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, petitioner also addressed the arguments presented by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment on the propriety of his dismissal from service. He avers that he has adequately controverted by clear and convincing evidence the unsubstantiated charges against him. Petitioner thus pleads anew for the immediate and urgent grant of his prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the order of dismissal of the Office of the Ombudsman. On 26 January 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution admitting the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman, again directing the OSG to file its Comment on the Petition on behalf of PNP-CIDG, and submitting for resolution petitioners application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The OSG, representing the PNP-CIDG, eventually filed its Comment on 31 January 2005. Finding that the execution of the judgment of dismissal from service of petitioner pending his appeal thereof would possibly work injustice to petitioner, or tend to render the judgment on his appeal ineffectual, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[13] on 1 March 2005 granting the writ of preliminary injunction, thus, ordering the Office of the Ombudsman and all persons action on its behalf from implementing its assailed Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12 October 2004, pending final determination of CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. The appellate court further directed the parties to submit their memoranda. Petitioner and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective Memoranda, while the OSG manifested that it was adopting its Comment and the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman on the Petition as its Memorandum. On 20 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, dismissing the Petition and affirming the dismissal from the service of petitioner as adjudged by the Office of the Ombudsman. It summed up its findings thus: To repeat, the administrative liabilities of the petitioner proven by substantial evidence is his failure to file a truthful and accurate SALN and possession of assets manifestly out of proportion of (sic) his legitimate income. Either one is legal basis for dismissal or removal from office. As a final recourse, the petitioner asks for the chance to correct his SALN before he should be held administratively liable. The Ombudsman ripostes that this would be a mockery of the law, saying that the SALN is not a misdeclare-first-and correct-if-caughtinstrument, but a full and solemn recording under oath of al (sic) the items required to be reported. Ipse dixit. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the petition DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary injunction is LIFTED.[14] The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution,[15] dated 4 October 2005, found that the arguments raised in petitioners Motion for Reconsideration had already been discussed and passed upon in its Decision, dated 20 July 2005, and there was no cogent reason to warrant reconsideration, much less, a reversal of the appellate courts original findings. Hence, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, dated 20 July 2005, and Resolution, dated 4 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals, based on the following grounds: a) The Court of Appeals committed grave error in law in allowing the active intervention of the Ombudsman in the review proceedings and invoking its arguments raised on appeal in the resolution of the case.[16] b) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in adopting in toto the appealed judgment of the Ombudsman, the finding being inconsistent with the evidence on record and the burden of proof required by law being higher than mere substantial evidence as the penalty involves dismissal from service.[17] c) The Court of Appeals committed grave error in law in declaring that petitioners resort to the Compliance and Review Procedure under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6713 is completely unavailing.[18] Pursuant to a Resolution issued by this Court on 26 June 2006, a temporary restraining order was issued in the following tenor: NOW, THEREFORE, you (the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways), your officers, agents, representatives, and/or persons acting upon your orders or, in your place or stead, are hereby ENJOINED, ORDERED, COMMANDED and DIRECTED to desist from implementing the assailed decision and order dated June 28, 2004 and October 12, 2004, respectively, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I entitled Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group vs. Salvador A. Pleyto dismissing herein petitioner from the service, as affirmed in the decision and resolution dated July 20, 2005 and October 4, 2005, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 entitled Salvador A. Pleyto vs. Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.[19] Having established the facts leading to the Petition at bar, this Court shall now proceed to review petitioners assigned errors one at a time. I. Petitioner raises before this Court his continued objection to the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. It should be recalled that the Office of the Ombudsman, although not named as a respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, filed its Comment and Memorandum therein, which were admitted by the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Ombudsman moved to intervene in the Court of Appeals proceedings in representation of the States interests. As a competent disciplining body, it asserts its rights to defend its own findings of fact and law relative to the imposition of its decisions and ensure that its judgments in administrative disciplinary cases be upheld by the appellate court, consistent with the doctrine laid down by this Court in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[20] and Philippine National Bank v. Garcia.[21] As the agency which rendered the assailed Decision, it is best equipped with the knowledge of the facts, laws and circumstances that led to the finding of guilt against petitioner. Petitioner opposed from the very beginning the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the appellate court proceedings. He pointed out to the Court of Appeals that only the PNP-CIDG was named as a respondent in his Petition for Review, and the Office of the Ombudsman was not impleaded because Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the court or agency which rendered the assailed decision should not be impleaded in the petition. He argued that the non-inclusion of the court or tribunal as respondent in cases elevated on appeal is founded on the doctrine that the court is not a combatant in the appeal proceedings. He called attention to previous rulings of this Court admonishing judges to maintain a posture of detachment in cases where their decisions are elevated on appeal or review. Petitioner, in the instant Petition, presents the same arguments in support of his first assignment of error. It is noted that the OSG, representing the PNP-CIDG, in its Comment and Memorandum before this Court, did not address the issue on the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, focusing solely on the issue on the propriety of the dismissal from service of petitioner. After a review of both positions on the matter of the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, this Court rules in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals indeed committed an error in admitting the Comment and Memorandum of the Office of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. Fabian v. Hon. Desierto[22] already settled that appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman should be brought first to the Court of Appeals via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, together with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95, governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. In specifying the contents of such a Petition for Review, both Rule 43 of the Rules of Court[23] and Administrative Circular No. 1-95[24] require the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the lower courts or agencies as petitioners or respondents. The only parties in an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court, or in this case, the administrative agency which rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in said appeal.[25] This is not a case wherein the petitioner improperly impleaded the Office of the Ombudsman in his Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. In fact, the petitioner adhered to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 1-95, by naming as respondent only the PNP-CIDG, the original complainant against him. It is the Office of the Ombudsman who actively sought to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. When a judge actively participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial instead.[26] The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal. The reliance of the Office of the Ombudsman on this Courts pronouncements in Dacoycoy and Garcia cases are misplaced. The issue in the landmark case Dacoycoy, was the right of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to file an appeal with this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating the civil service officer Dacoycoy from the administrative charges against him. According to Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within 15 days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within 15 days. Previous decisions of this Court ruled that the party adversely affected in Section 39 of the Civil Service Law, refers solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively disciplined and, hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty.It is within the foregoing context that this Court ruled in Dacoycoy in the following manner: Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office and not included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal. In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.[27] The similar issue arose in Garcia. In said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee Garcia the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the CSC exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against him. In accordance with its ruling in Dacoycoy, this Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to appeal to the Court of Appeals the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which complained of Garcias acts of dishonesty.  Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its fold.  PNB should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the country. Having established the foregoing, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Dacoycoy and Garcia to support its intervention in the appellate court proceedings for the following reasons: First, petitioner was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was in fact dismissed for grave misconduct and dishonesty by the Office of the Ombudsman in its decision in the administrative case, OMB-C-A-03-0347-I. Thus, it was petitioner who appealed to the Court of Appeals being, unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal. Second, the issue herein is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal. Its decision has not even been reversed yet so no question has arisen as to the standing of the Office of the Ombudsman to appeal from the reversal of its judgment. The Office of the Ombudsman only wishes to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086 to make sure that its decision dismissing petitioner from service is upheld by the appellate court. And third, Dacoycoy and Garcia should be read together with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[28] and National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[29] in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled: RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority.  Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal.  One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.   The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.  The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent.  Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.  Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared: To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies, not to litigate.[30] Should the Office of the Ombudsman insist on its right to intervene based on Dacoycoy and Garcia, then its exercise of such right should likewise be qualified according to Mathay and Mamauag. As the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and imposed the penalty, it must remain partial and detached. It must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. It should just have allowed the government agency prosecuting the administrative charges against petitioner, namely, the PNP-CIDG, appropriately represented by the OSG, to participate in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086. Not being an appropriate party to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, any participation of the Office of the Ombudsman therein, more particularly, through its Comment, Memorandum, and other pleadings, should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals. Not even the adoption by the OSG of the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman as its Memorandum can cure the defect of such Comment which was filed by a non-party to the case. To rule otherwise would be to condone the wrongful intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman in the appellate court proceedings and to allow a circumvention of a fundamental rule of procedure, for it would still afford the Office of the Ombudsman the opportunity to effectively present its position and arguments in the case despite its absence of interest or personality therein, a dangerous precedent indeed. Intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be allowed on liberality. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.[31]  Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[32] II. This Court now proceeds to petitioners second assignment of error in which he alleges that the judgment against him was grossly inconsistent with the evidence on record and the burden of proof required by law. Undoubtedly, petitioner is requesting that this Court consider and weigh again the evidence presented before the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as the Court of Appeals, and make its own findings of fact. While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the same is not absolute and there are recognized exceptions thereto. Courts may not be bound by the findings of fact of an administrative agency when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial;[33] when there is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction;[34] or when the precise issue in the case on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence supporting the findings of the administrative agency.[35] The last exception exists in this case and compels this Court to review the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. There are two principal findings against petitioner as a result of the proceedings below: (1) petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that his acquisition of properties, as well as his foreign travels, were within his lawful income; and (2) petitioner willfully concealed and misdeclared his assets in his 2001 and 2002 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). It was on the basis thereof that petitioner was found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty by both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals. The Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its investigating officers identified the following properties in the name of petitioner and his wife: a)      One residential house and lot in Quezon City; b)      Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:         Three residential lots measuring 998, 998 and 359 sq. m.;         One residential house built on a lot measuring 356 sq. m.; c)      Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:         Two commercial lots measuring 462 and 898 sq. m.;         Two residential lots measuring 143 and 152 sq. m.;         Four agricultural lots measuring 6,597; 1,000; 3,000; and 746 sq. m. d)      Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan:         Eight residential lots each measuring 340 sq. m.;         Four agricultural lots two of which measuring 140 sq. m. each and the other two measuring 450 sq. m. each.; and e) Three residential lots measuring 50, 500, and 600 sq. m., in Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[36] The same Complaint and Joint Affidavit also attributed to petitioner ownership of the following properties registered in the names of his children who were alleged to have no substantial income to acquire the same: a)      One residential house built on a lot measuring 632 sq. m. in the name of Russel Pleyto; b)      One residential lot measuring 113 sq. m. in the name of Russel Pleyto, married to Shirley Pleyto; c)      One commercial building on three commercial lots in the name of Mary Grace Pleyto; d)      One residential lot measuring 244 sq. m. in the name of Salvador Pleyto, Jr.; and e)      One residential lot measuring 138 sq. m. in the name of Mary Grace Pleyto.[37] All these properties are worth P16,686,643.20, based on their 2003 adjusted market value as determined by the local assessor, way over the total value of real properties declared by petitioner in his 2001 and 2002 SALNs, i.e., P5,956,400.00 and P9,384,090.25, respectively. In support of its foregoing allegations, the PNP-CIDG submitted the transfer certificates of title (TCTs), tax declarations, and pictures of the real properties in the names of the petitioner, his wife and children. It also presented copies of petitioners 2001 and 2002 SALNs so that the list of real properties and their values declared therein may be compared with the actual list of real properties and their values as uncovered by the PNP-CIDG in its investigation. Petitioner does not deny ownership of the real properties in his and his wifes names. What he contests with regard to the said real properties are the findings that these were beyond his and his wifes financial capacity to acquire and, thus, deemed to have been acquired illegally. Petitioner and his wife submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits, attaching thereto certificates of business registration, income tax returns, audited balance sheets, deeds of sale, and bank promissory notes, all meant to establish how petitioner and his wife acquired the said real properties. It is worthy to note that in its Decision, dated 27 May 2004, in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, the Office of the Ombudsman determined the value of the real properties in the names of petitioner and his wife to be P16,686,643.20, based on the 2003 adjusted market value of said real properties as assessed by the local assessor. While it may be conceded that the adjusted market value of the real properties is true and correct, such valuation bears no significance to the issue in this case, namely, whether petitioner and his wife had the financial capacity to acquire the real properties. To answer this question, the relevant valuation would be the acquisition cost of the real propertiesvis--vis, the financial capacity of the petitioner and his wife at the time of their acquisition. Any appreciation (or depreciation) in the value of the real properties after their acquisition until present has no bearing herein. To address this apparent faux pas, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Order, dated 12 October 2004, prepared a table,[38] this time, using the acquisition costs of petitioners real and personal properties as declared in his SALNs, to determine his net worth, which is then compared to his annual salary from 1992 to 2002, to wit: SUMMARY OF SALNs AND ANNUAL SALARY OF UNDERSECRETARY PLEYTO YEAR REAL PROPERTIES PERSONAL PROPERTIES LIABILITIES NETWORTH INC./(DEC) OF NETWORTH OVER PREVIOUS YEAR ANNUAL SALARY 1992 P1,004,100.00 P1,316,791.00 P1,425,000.00 P895,891.00 P136,620.00 1993 1,314,400.00 1,210,900.00 1,045,000.00 1,480,300.00 P584,409.00 166,980.00 1994 1,314,100.00 1,558,287.00 1,080,000.00 1,792,387.00 312,087.00 190,560.00 1995 2,064,100.00 1,714,677.30 1,780,000.00 1,998,777.30 206,390.30 202,560.00 1996 3,456,400.00 2,303,544.60 3,507,000.00 2,252,944.60 254,167.30 217,716.00 1997 3,526,400.00 2,884,066.00 3,800,000.00 2,610,466.00 357,521.40 239,472.00 1998 4,526,400.00 3,352,294.50 4,595,200.00 3,283,494.50 673,028.50 259,404.00 1999 4,526,400.00 4,105,107.50 4,340,142.80 4,291,364.70 1,007,870.20 265,896.00 2000 5,826,400.00 3,854,407.20 5,293,830.50 4,386,976.70 95,612.00 292,488.00 2001 5,956,400.00 4,029,641.40 5,401,488.80 4,584,552.60 197,575.90 314,784.00 2002 9,384,090.25 7,400,695.70 10,828,566.20 5,956,219.75 1,371,667.15 319,380.00 This table was meant to illustrate that it was impossible for petitioner to have acquired the real properties considering his annual salary. Based on the said table, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the Ombudsman that the progressive, albeit unexplained rise in petitioners net worth, is prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth. This Court is not convinced. The Court of Appeals applies against the petitioner the prima facie presumption laid down in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee And Providing for the Proceedings Therefor), which reads: Sec. 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) A prima facie presumption, also referred to as disputable, rebuttable or juris tantum,[39] is satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[40] The presumption in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 is merely prima facie and may still be overcome by evidence to the contrary. In fact, Section 5 of the same statute requires the court, before which the petition for forfeiture is filed, to set public hearings during which the public officer or employee may be given ample opportunity to explain to the satisfaction of the court how he had acquired the property in question. Similarly, the public officer or employee administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman, such as petitioner herein, must be given sufficient opportunity to present evidence to rebut the prima facie presumption applied against him: that his properties were illegally acquired. Indeed, after a cursory look at the table, it would be easy to conclude that petitioners annual salary cannot support his yearly increase in net worth, thus, giving rise to theprima facie presumption that petitioners properties, specifically the real properties, were acquired unlawfully. Nonetheless, this Court finds that the table prepared by the Office of the Ombudsman, using what the petitioner referred to as the net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis, may be effective only as an initial evaluation tool, meant to raise warning bells as to possible unlawful accumulation of wealth by a public officer or employee, but it is far from being conclusive proof of the same. While the variations in net worth from year to year may be readily apparent by mere comparison, the reasons thereformay not be so easily discerned. An increase in net worth in the succeeding year may not always be due to the acquisition of more properties by purchase. Many factors may account for the increase in net worth, such as the reduction or payment of liabilities in the succeeding year resulting in an increase in net worth even though the assets remain constant; or a donation or inheritance which may significantly increase the assets without any or with very minimal corresponding liability. Hence, net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis may seem deceptively simple, but it is, in fact, more complex, and prudence must be exercised in drawing conclusions therefrom. To rebut the supposed prima facie presumption against him, petitioner submitted evidence to explain the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of each of the real properties in his and his wifes names, and to show that his and his wifes combined incomes were sufficient for them to acquire said real properties. In his Petition before this Court, petitioner presented his own table[41] summarizing the properties he and his wife acquired and the evidence they submitted in support thereof. Said table is reproduced below: PROPERTY AREA (in square meters) YEAR OF ACQUI-SITION PURCHASE PRICE (In Pesos) MODE OF ACQUI- SITION PREVIOUS OWNER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 1. Residential LotQuezon City 385.4 1977 69,372.00 Purchase-through installment Urban Estates, Incorporated Contract to SellAttached as Annex 12 of Salvador PleytosCounter-Affidavit (Annex H of the Petition) 2. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 1,500.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 3. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 1,500.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 4. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 1,500.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 5. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 1,500.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 6. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 2,000.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 7. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1979 2,000.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 8. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1980 2,000.00 Purchase Anacoreta Reyes -do- Attached as Annexes 2 and 47 to 48 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 9. Residential Lot Caypombo, Sta. Maria 340 1980 2,000.00 Purchase Magno andAzucena Reyes -do- Attached as Annex 49 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 10. Residential Lot Poblacion, Sta. Maria 998 1987 (The TCT was issued in 1991 under TCT No. 141909) - Inheritance Candido Guballaand Maria Diaz -do- Extra-Judicial Partition and Subdivision Plan Attached as Annexes 30-31 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 11. Residential Lot Poblacion, Sta. Maria 998 1987 (The TCT was issued in 1993 under TCT No. 182666) - Inheritance Candido Guballaand Maria Diaz -do- Extra-Judicial Partition and Subdivision Plan Attached as Annexes 30-31 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 12. Residential Lot Poblacion, Sta. Maria 356 1988 40,000.00 Purchase Thelma CruzCelestino STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annex 34 of Miguela Pleyots [sic] Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 13. Residential Lot Poblacion, Sta. Maria 359 1995 251,300.00 Purchase DionisioBuenaventura -do- Attached as Annex 32 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 14. Agricultural Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 1,000 1996 60,000.00 Purchase Anita Caidoy -do- Attached as Annex 44 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 15. Residential Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 152 1996 40,000.00 Purchase Ramon and ElizabethHambre -do- Attached as Annex 42 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 16. Commercial Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 462 1997 138,600.00 Purchase MarieConcepcion J. Nicolas -do- Attached as Annex 38 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 17. Commercial Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 898 1997 120,000.00 Purchase Ma. ConcepcionNicolas and Madonna Nicolas -do- Attached as Annex 40 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 18. Agricultural Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 6,587 1998 500,000.00 Purchase Reynaldo Evangelista -do- Attached as Annex 43 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 19. Residential Lot Catmon, Sta. Maria 100 1998 100,000.00 Purchase RositaResurreccion -do- Annex 50 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter - Affidavit (attached as Annex I of the Petition) 20. Residential Lot Catmon, Sta. Maria 500 1998 200,000.00 Purchase Macaria andHerminigildoRamos -do- Attached as Annex 51 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 21. Residential Lot Catmon, Sta. Maria 600 1998 300,000.00 Purchase Zosima andTeotimo delaCruz -do- Attached as Annex 52 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 22. Residential Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 143 1999 42,900.00 Purchase Lorenzo Gonzales andRemediosGonzales -do- Attached as Annex 41 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 23. Agricultural Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 3,000 1999 153,909.30 Foreclosure/ Dacion EliseoHermogenes Real Estate MortgageAttached as Annexes 45 and 46 of MiguelaPleytos Supplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) 24. Agricultural Lot Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria 746 1999 38,272.00 Purchase EliseoHermogenes STANDARD DEED OF SALE FORM used by Mrs. Pleyto in her lending business in cases where the defaulting debtor opts to settle the unpaid account with property. Attached as Annex 46 of Miguela PleytosSupplemental Counter-Affidavit (Annex I of the Petition) In addition to the foregoing 24 lots identified by the PNP-CIDG in its Complaint, petitioner voluntarily disclosed two more lots in his and his wifes names in Caysio, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, which they acquired through foreclosure in 2002. Petitioners table comprehensively presents his and his wifes real properties, the names of the previous owners, the cost, year and mode of their acquisitions, and the supporting evidence. It reveals that the petitioner and his wife acquired their real properties in a span of 22 years, from 1977 to 1999. A number of the real properties were acquired before 1992, the year from which the Office of the Ombudsman began his net-worth-to-income-discrepancy analysis. Petitioner and his wife acquired the real properties by four modes: (1) purchase by installment; (2) inheritance; (3) dacion en pago, by which the defaulting debtor settles his outstanding account with petitioners wife with property; and (4) foreclosure of mortgage. The last two modes of acquisition, dacion en pago and foreclosure of mortgage, are exercised in the regular conduct of the lending business of petitioners wife. Irrefragably, these are legitimate modes of acquiring properties. On their face, the supporting documents for the transactions by which petitioner and his wife acquired their real properties appear to be in order. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Court of Appeals did not challenge the validity or authenticity of any of these documentary evidences. They, instead, focused on questioning the financial capacity of petitioner and his wife to acquire all these real properties. Petitioner asserts that, other than his salary as a government employee, he and his wife had other sources of income which enabled them to acquire real properties.Petitioners wife, Miguela Pleyto, has been a successful businesswoman since 1976, operating several businesses, particularly, a piggery and poultry farm, a pawnshop, and a lending investor business. To prove that these are legitimate businesses, petitioner submitted registration papers and certifications from the Department of Trade and Industry.[42] Also to establish the profits from these businesses, petitioner presented the income tax returns and financial statements of his wifes businesses.[43] Moreover, petitioner annexed to his Counter-Affidavit a schedule of loans availed of by petitioner and his wife from different banks from 1979 to 2002, secured by real estate mortgages[44] constituted on their existing real properties and annotated on the appropriate TCTs. As petitioner explained, the properties were accumulated over the last two decades. Most of the properties are integral to his wifes piggery and lending business.Twelve of the properties he and his wife acquired, including four structures, were devoted to the piggery, while the others were used as collaterals for short-term loans, the proceeds of which were used by his wife in her lending business and which, in turn, enabled her to acquire more properties when defaulting borrowers settled their obligations through dacion en pago or foreclosure of mortgages. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected petitioners allegations and evidence of other legitimate sources of income, for the following reasons: Logic will dictate that the whole divide between assets and income may be closed by evidence that the wife was herself earning enough to account for the acquisition of properties. The spirited position taken by the petitioner on this point, however, did not wash with the Ombudsman. The reason seems to be that he was trying to tout his wifes gross income as proof of her capacity when he should prove her disposable income after deducting her taxes and expenses. The Ombudsman insisted on this approach after realizing that the petitioner and his family had indulged in rather heavy spending. x x x The argument meets with the concurrence of the Solicitor General. He says in his comments, that the gross income of the wife from her business should not be made a barometer of her financial capacity, but to be believable, she should specify her available income after deducting all expenses and taxes, a procedure she did not follow.[45] It is worthy to note that the Office of the Ombudsman, in preparing the table in its 12 October 2004 Order, used petitioners gross annual salary for comparison with his annual net worth. Thus, it is only understandable that, in challenging the said table, petitioner touted his wifes gross annual business income, which he urged should be combined with his gross annual salary. Also considering that the information the Court of Appeals was looking for could actually be deduced and computed from the income tax returns and financial statements already submitted by petitioner, this Court finds it arbitrary for the appellate court to simply brush aside petitioners evidence just because it was not presented in the form that it expected. Bearing in mind the significance and impact on the case of petitioners evidence, it deserves a closer and more thorough review. Furthermore, in his Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, petitioner directly addressed the afore-quoted observation of the appellate court by presenting the following table[46] in which taxes and expenses were already deducted from his wifes business income: DATE YEARLY INCREASE/ DECREASE IN NETWORTH SALARY INCOME BUSINESS INCOME (Income from Business + Depreciation Cost) TOTAL INCOME (Salary Income + Business Income 1992 - 136,620.00 180,438.50 317,058.50 1993 584,409.00 166,980.00 181,703.00 348,683.00 1994 312,087.00 190,560.00 242,817.60 433,377.60 1995 206,390.30 202,560.00 240,917.62 443,477.62 1996 254,167.30 217,716.00 333,908.96 551,624.96 1997 357,521.40 239,472.00 489,023.46 728,495.46 1998 673,028.50 259,404.00 485,105.79 744,509.79 1999 1,007,870.20 265,896.00 507,845.21 773,741.21 2000 95,612.00 292,488.00 570,280.67 862,768.67 2001 197,575.90 314,784.00 596,980.95 911,764.95 2002 1,371,667.15 319,380.00 969,565.05 1,288,945.05 TOTAL 5,060,328.75 2,605,860.00 4,798,586.81 7,404,446.81 The figures in the business income column were derived from the income statements of Miguela Pleyto, annexed to her income tax returns, which were prepared by a certified public accountant and submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The business income figures are already net of business expenses and provisions for income taxes, but include the amounts of depreciation[47] of buildings, equipment, and furniture/fixtures. Based on the foregoing table, the increase in petitioners net worth from 1992 to 2002 (P5,060,328.75) no longer appears to be grossly disproportionate to his and his wifes combined income for the same period (P7,404,446.81). At this point, it is undeniable that petitioner had other sources of income apart from his salary. His wife was also earning substantial income from her businesses.According to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition would arise only when the amount of property is manifestly out of proportion to the salary of the public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Other than the real properties, both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals deemed the numerous foreign travels of petitioner, his wife, and his children as proof of petitioners unexplained wealth, relying on the following attestations[48] of the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG: 10. Our verification with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on the travels abroad made by Mr. Pleyto (and his son Salvador Juan Jr) for the duration of his stint as a DPWH official revealed that since 1995, Mr. Pleyto had made seventeen (17) travels abroad. Our cross-checking with the declared official travels abroad of Mr. Pleyto, as appearing in his Personal Data Sheet, revealed that he had made a total of nine (9) unofficial travels abroad. BID records also show that in his two (2) trips abroad, he brought along his son Salvador Juan Pleyto, Jr. that is, when he went on the REAAA council meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1999 and when he went to the US also in October 2000 on an unofficial trip(Annexes 81 and 82); His wife Miguela had seventeen (17) travels abroad (Annex 83) while his other son, Russel had six (6) travels abroad (Annex 84) 11. We have estimated that the sum total of the expenses incurred by Mr. Salvador A. Pleyto for the travels abroad by him, his wife and children, at P100,000.00 per travel amounted to THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00), broken down as follows: Salvador A. Pleyto 9 travels - P900,000.00 Miguela G. Pleyto 17 travels - 1,700,000.00 Russel G. Pleyto 6 travels - 600,000.00 Salvador G. Pleyto Jr., 5 travels - 500,000.00 TOTAL : P3,700,000.00 While the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG also referred to the trips abroad taken by petitioners children, this Court shall discuss first only the foreign travels of petitioner and his wife. The foreign travels, as well as the real properties of their children, shall be the subject of a separate and later discussion. After going through the records, the only evidence presented by the PNP-CIDG as regards the foreign travels of petitioner and his family are the travel records[49]provided by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), from which the following information were derived: TRAVEL INFORMATION OF SALVADOR A. PLEYTO Full Name DOB Nationality Passport No. Address : : : : : Salvador Pleyto y Aquino March 22, 1942 Filipino K862613/CC272892 No. 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City Departure Date Destination Arrival Date - Tapei April 22, 1995 October 25, 1995 Seoul November 06, 1995 May 17, 1996 Hongkong May 19, 1996 June 15, 1997 Tokyo July 04, 1997 October 01, 1997 Honolulu October 17, 1997 October 07, 1998 USA October 10, 1998 March 27, 1999 Los Angeles April 06, 1999 May 07, 1999 Hongkong May 09, 1999 October 02, 1999 Kuala Lumpur October 10, 1999 March 27, 2000 Hongkong May 02, 2000 September 03, 2000 USA October 01, 2000 October 24, 2000 USA - March 20, 2001 USA May 01, 2001 April 18, 2002 - April 22, 2002 May 10, 2002 USA - October 02, 2002 - October 08, 2002 May 18, 2003 - June 25, 2003 Total No. of Travels Abroad: Seventeen (17) TRAVEL INFORMATION OF MIGUELA PLEYTO Full Name DOB Nationality Passport No. Address : : : : : Miguela Pleyto y Guballa March 28, 1940 Filipino K850031/CC264659/JJ329075 No. 1 May Street, Congressional Village, Quezon City Departure Date Destination Arrival Date October 25, 1995 Seoul/Korea November 06, 1995 May 17, 1996 Hongkong May 19, 1996 July 12, 1996 - July 29, 1996 October 01, 1997 Honolulu October 17, 1997 May 19, 1998 Los Angeles May 27, 1998 October 07, 1998 USA October 10, 1998 March 27, 1999 Los Angeles April 06, 1999 May 07, 1999 Hongkong May 09, 1999 October 05, 1999 Singapore October 10, 1999 October 05, 1999 San Francisco October 14, 1999 July 14, 2000 Bangkok July 19, 2000 October 29, 2000 Hongkong November 06, 2000 April 20, 2001 USA July 22, 2001 April 18, 2002 Los Angeles May 01, 2001 May 10, 2002 Bangkok April 22, 2002 September 30, 2002 Bangkok October 08, 2002 May 18, 2003 Bangkok May 25, 2003 Total No. of Travels Abroad: Seventeen (17) From 1995 to 2003, petitioner traveled abroad 17 times; 8 trips were found by the investigating officers to be official and only 9 were unofficial. Their summary, though, failed to indicate which of petitioners trips were official and which were unofficial. It would appear that only the 9 unofficial foreign trips are being charged against petitioner. For the same period, petitioners wife also took 17 trips abroad. Petitioner offered the following explanation for his and his wifes foreign travels:                     As to petitioner Pleyto, his alleged travel expense of Php 900 thousand is unfounded. His (9) unofficial travels (official time but with no cost to the government) were all shouldered by sponsoring organizations such as the Road Engineering Association of Asia and Australia (REEAA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers, Philippine Chapter, where he has served as President. The sponsorship includes travel and accommodation and sometimes even one (1) companion. These facts have not been disputed on record. (In fact, for this year, petitioner Pleyto was again a beneficiary of sponsorship travel extended by REEA (sic) where he continues to serve as President.)         As to Mrs. Pleyto, her alleged travel expense of Php 1.7 M (at Php 100,000 per travel) is bloated and unsubstantiated. To begin with, the number of travels appears to be inaccurate as previously explained. Besides, the estimated expense of Php 100,000 per travel is grossly exaggerated as most of the travels were to Asian destinations. As shown by evidence, the travel package (fare and accommodation) only averages from Php 15,000 to Php 25,000 which contention has not been disputed by contrary evidence. Besides, Mrs. Pleyto, who is already in her senior years and with no more children to support, is entitled to enjoy the comforts of travel.[50] While 26 foreign trips[51] may indeed seem excessive, it should be kept in mind that these were taken by two individuals in a span of 9 years. Frequency of foreign travel, by itself, is not proof of unexplained wealth of a public officer or employee. More importantly, it must be established that the trips abroad are beyond his financial capacity, taking into account his salary and his other lawful sources of income. The travel records from the BID could only establish the details on the trips taken by petitioner and his wife, specifically, the dates of departure and arrival, the destination, and the frequency thereof. Even these details were at times incomplete or contradictory. Take for example the travel information of petitioner, with several missing entries on the dates of departure and arrival and destination. As for the travel information of petitioners wife, it failed to identify her destination for her trip on 12 to 29 July 1996.The travel information also states that petitioners wife was in Singapore from 5 to 10 October 1999, yet, in the immediately succeeding entry, it provides that she was inSan Francisco, United States of America (USA) from 5 to 14 October 1999. Also according to the travel information, petitioners wife left for Bangkok, Thailand on 10 May 2002 and returned to the country on 22 April 2002. It appears to this Court that complete reliance was made on the travel records provided by the BID. No further effort was exerted to complete the travel information of petitioner and his wife and clarify or reconcile confusing entries. It is a long jump to conclude just from the BID travel records that the foreign travels taken by petitioner and his wife were beyond their financial capacity. As this Court has already found, petitioner had other sources of lawful income apart from his salary as a public official. His wife was also earning substantial income from her businesses. Now the question is, whether the petitioner and his wife could afford all their trips abroad considering their combined income. Obviously, before this question can be answered, the cost of the trips must be initially determined. The investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG estimated the cost of each trip to be P100,000.00, an estimation subsequently adopted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals. This Court, though, cannot simply affirm such estimation. Other than the USA (wherein Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu are located), petitioner and his wife only traveled to cities in East and Southeast Asia(namely, Taipei, Seoul, Hongkong, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok). The costs of the trips to the USA and to the neighboring Asian countries cannot be the same; the latter would undeniably be cheaper. The investigating officers, in fixing the amount of all the foreign trips at P100,000.00 each, offered no explanation or substantiation for the same. With utter lack of basis, the figure of P100,000.00 as cost for each foreign travel is random and arbitrary and, thus, unacceptable to this Court. Without a reasonable estimation of the costs of the foreign travels of petitioner and his wife, there is no way to determine whether these were within their lawful income. This Court finds equally baseless the conclusion that petitioners children are without substantial income of their own, hence, their properties and foreign travels should be attributed to petitioner and considered as additional evidence of his unexplained wealth. Petitioners children are all grown up with the youngest, at the time the case was pending before the Office of the Ombudsman, being 27 years old. Russel and Mary Grace Pleyto, the two older children, are engaged in businesses, while Salvador Pleyto, Jr., is gainfully employed in his mothers businesses. The following real properties are registered and duly covered by certificates of title in their names: a)                  Russel Pleyto (2 properties) 1.      one residential house and lot measuring 632 sq. m. in Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan; 2.      one (1) residential lot measuring 113 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan; b)                  Mary Grace Pleyto (2 properties) 1.      one (1) residential lot measuring 138 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Bulacan; 2.      one (1) commercial lot measuring 133 sq. m., broken down into three lots at 41, 59, and 43 sq. m., in Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan; and c)                  Salvador, Jr. (1 property) 1.      one (1) residential lot measuring 244 sq. m. in Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[52] Given these circumstances, the presumption in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, cannot be automatically extended to the properties that are registered in the names of petitioners children. The burden is upon the PNP-CIDG, as the complainant against petitioner, to establish that these properties are actually owned by petitioner by proving first that his children had no financial means to acquire the said properties. Fundamental is the rule that the burden of evidence lies with the person who asserts an affirmative allegation.[53] Unfortunately, the PNP-CIDG miserably failed in this regard. Without presenting any supporting evidence, the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG alleged in their Joint Affidavit that it can be immediately deduced that the real properties, both the houses and lots, registered in the names of their three (3) children, namely: Russel Pleyto, Mary Grace Pleyto and Salvador Juan Pleyto, Jr., are [petitioners] unexplained wealth, since all of them have no substantial income to show that they have the capacity to lawfully acquire the same.[54] The use of the words immediately deduced is very revealing of the attitude and approach taken by the investigating officers in this case, again, jumping to a conclusion without reference to and presentation of the evidence in support thereof. The same can also be said of the foreign travels of Russel Pleyto and Salvador Pleyto, Jr., which, without any explanation or basis whatsoever, were included in the computation of travel expenses charged against petitioner. It is thus surprising that the Office of the Ombudsman affirmed the bare allegations of the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG, by ruling that: [T]he following real properties registered in the name of respondent Pleytos three (3) children, are actually the [petitioner]s unexplainable wealth, since all of them have no substantial income to show that they have lawfully acquired the same, x x x. x x x x The annexes submitted do not show substantial net disposable income earned by them. With respect to Salvador, Jr., no income tax return was submitted. Further, there was no credible explanation for the sizeable start-up capitals for their alleged businesses. No proof was submitted as to the alleged donation of P200,000.00 from the parents of respondent RusselPleytos wife. As to the alleged donation of P60,000.00, it admittedly came from respondents Salvador and Miguela Pleyto.[55] This Court cannot sustain such finding. Although strictly, the burden of evidence had not shifted to petitioner, he still endeavored to elucidate on how his children legitimately acquired their respective properties, to wit: As to Russel G. Pleyto, the following facts and explanations are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence         Since 1991 or for over ten years, Russel and his wife, Shirley Yap, daughter of established businessman in Bulacan, have been engaged in businesses in Sta. Maria, starting with grocery and garments which they built from a meager capital of Php60,000.00 extended by Mr. and Mrs. Pleyto by way of a deed of donation during their marriage as well as Php200,000.00 from Shirleys parents. They also obtained financial accommodations and stocks for their grocery and garments from Shirleys family who are also engaged in the same line of business.         Their financial capacity is shown by documentary evidence such as business permits/licenses of their business enterprises; financial statements and income tax returns from 1998 to 2002, showing gross sales/receipts from grocery and video sales rentals amounting to P7,271,137; various credit lines extended to Shirley Yap-Pleyto in the grocery business.         In the course of their business, Russel and Shirley Yap-Pleyto were able to acquire two (2) properties: the first refers to their residential house and lot inPoblacion, Sta. Maria, which was acquired six years after their marriage; the second refers to a small parcel of land consisting of 113 sq. meters in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin. Since both of them are engaged in gainful business, there is no way they cannot acquired (sic) the subject properties. As to Mary Grace G. Pleyto, the following explanations and evidence are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence         Mary Grace has been an entrepreneur since 1995, starting off with small laundry business and branching to water refilling and video sales. While she obtained her course from UP, she learned the ropes of entrepreneurship from her own mother. And if she has received any assistance in her business, it was also from her mother, and not from any imputed unexplained wealth of her father. Like her mother, she also made use of banks to support her business requirements.         From 1997 to 2001, she was able to acquire the commercial property in Sta. Maria measuring 143 sq. meters, broken down into three (3) lots at 41 sq. meters, 59 sq. meters, and 43 sq. meters. This property was broken down into three lots because she acquired it portion by portion and in a span of four years. In addition, she also acquired a residential lot in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin measuring only 138 sq. meteres (TCT No. 397717[M]).         When she purchased her first two properties valued at Php131,600, her BIR records and financial statements for the preceding years (1995-1996) already reflect an income of Php531,930, which is more than enough to cover the purchase. As proof of her financial capacity, she has been extended loans byMetrobank using as collateral the same property she acquired. Based on her income tax return and loan documents, there is no reason why she cannot acquire the two (2) properties owned and registered in her name. As to Salvador G. Pleyto, Jr., the following explanations and evidence are uncontroverted by any contrary evidence         Salvador Jr., a La Salle graduate in B.S. Management, has been gainfully employed since 1998 in her mothers businesses, managing R.S. Pawnshop and R.S. Lending Investor. Based on his income tax returns for the years 1999 to 2002 (sic), his earnings amounted to P186, 520.         In 2001, he was able acquire a property in the interior side of Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria for only P20,000 as evidenced by the purchase document.         Considering his reported income in the preceding years (1999 to 2000) as reflected in his BIR tax records, there is no reason why he could not have acquired the subject property for Php20,000.[56] To substantiate his foregoing assertions, petitioner presented the TCTs in his childrens names, deeds of sale executed by the previous owners to his children, his childrens income tax returns and financial statements, business registrations, and bank documents on loans and credit lines.[57] Certificates of title are the best proof of ownership[58] that may only be rebutted by competent evidence to the contrary. In this case, the TCTs are in the names of petitioners children. Indubitably, mere allegation that the properties covered by the TCTs are actually owned by someone else is insufficient. The Office of the Ombudsman disparaged the other documentary evidence submitted by petitioner because they do not show substantial net disposable income earned by petitioners children. To the contrary, the petitioner presented his childrens income tax returns and financial statements that state their gross income, as well as expenses, taxes, and any other deductible liabilities, from which the childrens respective net incomes may be determined. Moreover, it is futile for the Office of the Ombudsman to require the petitioner to present the net disposable income of his children when the PNP-CIDG failed to establish the acquisition costs of these properties.What the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG stated in their Joint-Affidavit were the adjusted market values of the childrens properties. As this Court has ruled, financial capacity shall be adjudged vis--vis the cost of the properties at the time of acquisition. The subsequent increase (or decrease) in the value of the properties is irrelevant. Without the acquisition costs of the properties, there are no figures that may be measured against the earning capacity of petitioners children at the time they acquired their properties. Furthermore, faced with overwhelming evidence that petitioners two older children, Russel and Mary Grace Pleyto, had their own businesses from which they derived substantial income, the Office of the Ombudsman changed the direction of its attack by questioning their source of capital. This is plainly a different theory from the one originally presented in the PNP-CIDG complaint that petitioners children could not have acquired their properties because they had no substantial income of their own. No longer is it just a question of ownership of the properties in the childrens names, but it is now extended to the ownership of the childrens businesses. Just the same, the assertion that petitioners children could not have established and maintained their own businesses must be supported by evidence, of which none was submitted herein. As a final note on this matter, the charges that petitioner is the true owner of the properties registered in his childrens names and that he spent for their foreign travels must be proven by the PNP-CIDG as the complainant in the administrative case, before the burden of evidence shifts to the petitioner to prove the contrary. The PNP-CIDG cannot just make bare allegations, with tremendous implications and damaging effects, then leave it to the public official charged to successfully and effectively defend himself with controverting evidence. Such is what has happened in this case. Worse, despite the total absence of evidence on the part of the PNP-CIDG regarding the properties and sources of income of petitioners children, the Office of the Ombudsman hastily dismissed the value of petitioners evidence. The last administrative charge against petitioner is that he failed to declare all his assets in the SALN, of which the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals made the following findings on this point: Second, failing to declare all his assets in the SALN. A treasure trove of properties admitted by the petitioner to be owned by him and his wife could not be accounted for in the SALN. The non-declaration of his numerous acquisitions was thus willful. The Ombudsman senses that the unexplained rise in the reported net worth of the petitioner would be more astronomical if he were forthright in his declarations. x x x x The Ombudsman has found that there are, indeed, properties not reported in the SALN. The laundry list of undeclared assets include properties acquired in 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999. While the petitioners wife claims to be extensively engaged in business, the SALN also did not report the nature and other particulars of these concerns. She signed the 2001 SALN without answering the question: Do you have any business interest and other financial connections including those of your spouse x x x? It is clear that the SALN does not reflect a true and accurate record of the assets of the petitioner in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The addition of the acquisition costs of the unreported assets to the net worth, moreover, will increase it. As dramatized by the Ombudsmans table, the increase in the net worth could not be explained by the petitioners salary alone and, hence should be treated as unexplained wealth.[59] Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, requires that a public officer file his statement of assets and liabilities under the following circumstances: SEC. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of Head of Department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of said calendar year. A similar requirement is provided in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which reads: SEC. 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The two documents shall contain information on the following: (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value; (b)   personal property and acquisition cost; (c)    all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like; (d)   liabilities; and (e)    all business interests and financial connections. The documents must be filed: (a)    within thirty (30) days after assumption of office; (b)   on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and (c)    within thirty (30) days after separation from service. All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible the year when they first assumed any office in the government. It is undisputed that petitioner has been religiously filing his SALN every year while he was in government service. The allegation of gross misconduct and dishonesty against him is rooted in his purported failure to declare all his assets and business interests in his SALNs. Petitioners 2002 SALN declared only 13 properties with a total acquisition cost of P9,384,090.25. Petitioner though admitted in the course of these proceedings that he and his wife owned 28 of the 33 real properties identified by the PNP-CIDG, with the clarification that four of those are mere improvements consisting of piggery structures.Hence, petitioner professes ownership by him and his wife of 24 lots, plus the improvements found thereon. He further volunteers the information that he and his wife acquired two more additional properties in Caysio, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in 2002, thus, bringing the total number of his and his wifes real property acquisition to 26. Petitioner denies he was being dishonest or that he had the deliberate intent to conceal his wealth in his 2002 SALN, although he acknowledges that he failed to pay attention to the details therein. His SALNs are prepared by a family bookkeeper/accountant. Also, his wife has been running their financial affairs, including property acquisitions which form part and parcel of her lending business. Thus, as he was not directly involved in the various transactions relating to the lending business, petitioner failed to keep track of the real property acquisitions by reason thereof. Consequently, petitioners SALN was not filed in proper form, containing several inaccurate information, such as discrepancies in the year and mode of acquisition of the declared properties, and imprecise descriptions of the said properties since some of the properties were not broken down to their individual titles and, instead, treated as one entry since they are contiguous to one another and to fit all the information in the limited number of spaces provided in the printed SALN form. And these inaccuracies are repeated year after year, since the common practice is copying the entries in the immediately preceding year and just adding any subsequent acquisitions. In his 2004 SALN,[60] petitioner took pains to rectify the inaccuracies in his previous SALN and declared his real properties as follows: Kind Location Year Mode of Acquisition Acquisition Cost (Land, Bldg., Imrpovement, etc.) 1 H & L Quezon City 197[7] Purchase 2,630,000.00 1 H & L Caypombo, Bulacan 1980 Purchase 190,000.00 1 Lot - do - 1982 - do - I Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot (impvt) - do - 1979 - do - 1 Lot (impvt) - do - - do - 1 Lot (impvt) - do - 1979 - do - 1 Lot (impvt) - do - - do - 1 H & L Poblacion, Bulacan 1988 Purchase 1,937,700.00 1 Lot - do - 1987 Inheritance 1 Lot - do - 1991 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1993 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1995 Purchase/Foreclosure 1 Lot P. Buhangin, Bulacan 1996 Purchase/Foreclosure 1,898,700.00 1 Lot - do - 1996 - do - 1 H & L - do - 1997 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1998 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1999 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1999 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1999 - do - 1 Lot - do - 1999 - do - 1 Lot Catmon, Bulacan 1998 Purchase/Foreclosure 1,300,000.00 1 Lot - do - - do - 1 Lot - do - - do - 2 Lots w/ imprvt Caysio, Sta. Maria,Bulacan 2002 Purchase/Foreclosure 1,427,690.25 1 Lot P. Buhangin, Bulacan 2003 Purchase/Foreclosure 100,000.00 TOTAL COST P 9,484,090.25 Except for the lot in Pulong Buhangin, Bulacan, which was purchased only in 2003, the afore-quoted declaration of petitioners real properties in his 2004 SALN tallies with that in his 2002 SALN. Disregarding the most recent acquisition, the longer and more detailed list of real properties in the 2004 SALN has the same total acquisition cost as the 13 entries in the 2002 SALN, i.e., P9,384,090.25. As additional proof that his 2002 SALN actually includes all his real properties, petitioner points out that the total acquisition cost thereof, P9,384,090.25, is not so far off their 2003 adjusted market value (excluding the real properties in the names of petitioners children) ofP14,002,109.20 as determined by the PNP-CIDG; the difference can be accounted for by the increase in the value of the real properties through the years. In contrast, according to the investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG, [s]ince Mr. Pleyto did not specify in his SALs the exact location of the real properties he and his own wife own, it would not be too easy for the investigators to ascertain which specifically of these numerous real estate properties acquired by the spouses were or were not declared in his latest statement of assets.[61] Hence, there is no categorical finding by the investigating officers that certain properties were intentionally excluded or concealed by petitioner from his 2002 SALN. Much of the difficulty in reconciling the list of real properties in the names of petitioner and his wife vis--vis the entries in petitioners 2002 SALN is due to the inaccuracies in the latter as previously discussed. Without considering the elucidation offered by petitioner and refusing to concede that inaccuracies were committed in the preparation of the 2002 SALN, the Office of the Ombudsman could not reconcile any of the real properties admittedly owned by petitioner and his wife with the real properties declared in the 2002 SALN. This includes petitioners residence in Quezon City, which evidence shows he and his wife acquired in 1977, but was erroneously reported in his 2002 SALN to have been acquired in 1975. Following the ratiocination of the Office of the Ombudsman, then it would appear that petitioner completely falsified his declaration of real properties in his 2002 SALN. However, it must be pointed out that petitioner was originally accused of and found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals of the relatively less serious charge of excluding or concealing some of his properties. Petitioner is charged with gross misconduct and dishonesty for failing to comply with Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, requiring the submission of a statement of assets and liabilities by a public officer or employee. As for gross misconduct, the adjective is gross or serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling; while the noun is "misconduct," defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The word "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. For gross misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[62] And as for dishonesty, it is committed by intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Dishonesty is understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.[63] Clear from the foregoing legal definitions of gross misconduct and dishonesty is that intention is an important element in both. Petitioners candid admission of his shortcomings in properly and completely filling out his SALN, his endeavor to clarify the entries therein and provide all other necessary information, and his submission of supporting documents as to the acquisition of the real properties in his and his wifes names, negate any intention on his part to conceal his properties. Furthermore, in view of this Courts findings that these properties were lawfully acquired, there is simply no justification for petitioner to hide them. Missing the essential element of intent to commit a wrong, this Court cannot declare petitioner guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. Neither can petitioners failure to answer the question, Do you have any business interest and other financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children living in your house hold? be tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of petitioners 2002 SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it can be logically deduced that she had business interests. Such a statement of his wifes occupation would be inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wifes business interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had business interests is thus readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or investigation. An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross misconduct, and is merely simple negligence.[64] Thus, at most, petitioner is guilty of negligence for having failed to ascertain that his SALN was accomplished properly, accurately, and in more detail. Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[65] In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[66] Both Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees require the accomplishment and submission of a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities. Petitioner was negligent for failing to comply with his duty to provide a detailed list of his assets and business interests in his SALN. He was also negligent in relying on the family bookkeeper/accountant to fill out his SALN and in signing the same without checking or verifying the entries therein. Petitioners negligence, though, is only simple and not gross, in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part, and in consideration of the fact that his SALNs actually disclose the full extent of his assets and the fact that he and his wife had other business interests. Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious charges which warrant the removal or dismissal from service of the erring public officer or employee, together with the accessory penalties, such as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Hence, a finding that a public officer or employee is administratively liable for such charges must be supported by substantial evidence. The quantum of evidence required in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[67] laid down the guidelines for quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, including the following: (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0.G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial. (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.)"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.) " (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) In the Petition at bar, great, if not absolute, reliance was made by the Office of the Ombudsman on the Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its investigating officers. Although certain pieces of documentary evidence were also attached to the said Complaint, such as TCTs and tax declarations of the real properties in the names of petitioner, his wife, and his children, and the travel information provided by the BID, these mostly prove facts which were not denied by petitioner, but for which he had credible explanation or qualification. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to give rise to a prima facie presumption of unlawfully acquired wealth against petitioner; however, such a presumption is disputable or rebuttable. When petitioner presented evidence in support of his defense, the Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to question and challenge and, ultimately, disregard in totality petitioners evidence, despite the fact that the PNP-CIDG no longer presented any evidence to controvert the same. Each party in an administrative case must prove his affirmative allegation with substantial evidence the complainant has to prove the affirmative allegations in his complaint, and the respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and counterclaims.[68] In this case, contrary to the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals, this Court pronounces that substantial evidence sways in favor of the petitioner and against complainant PNP-CIDG. While this Court commends the efforts of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the Ombudsman to hold accountable public officers and employees with unexplained wealth and unlawfully acquired properties, it cannot countenance unsubstantiated charges against a hapless public official just to send a message that the government is serious in its campaign against graft and corruption. No matter how noble the intentions of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the Ombudsman are in pursuing this administrative case against petitioner, it will do them well to remember that good intentions do not win cases; evidence does. III. Petitioners third assignment of error concerns the review and compliance procedure provided in Section 10 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, reproduced in full below: SEC. 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements have been submitted on time, are complete and are in proper form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action. (b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall base the power, within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned. The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act. (c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department. Petitioner argues that he should have been given the opportunity to correct his obviously incomplete and/or not properly filed SALN in accordance with the afore-quoted review and compliance procedure. This Court is unconvinced. From a reading of the provision in question, it is apparent that it primarily imposes upon the heads of offices the duty to review the SALNs of their subordinates. If a head of office finds that the SALN of a certain subordinate is incomplete or not in the proper form, then the head of office must inform the subordinate concerned and direct him to take corrective action. Unquestionably, it is an internal procedure limited within the office concerned. It does not even provide for instances when a complainant, not the head of office, may question the SALN of a public officer or employee. Such a procedure does not find application in the Petition at bar, because petitioners SALN was not being reviewed or questioned by his head of office, but by the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether or not petitioners SALN was actually reviewed by his head of office is irrelevant and cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation of petitioner for violation of Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, as well as Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, upon the filing of a Complaint by the PNP-CIDG. The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, in this wise: Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Section 13 thereof, vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient; (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties; (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action; (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents; (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence; (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, intended to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. The provisions of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.[69] Given its mandate, the Office of the Ombudsman can review the SALN of a public officer or employee if a complaint is filed against the latter, separate and independent of the review of the SALN by the public officer or employees head of office. In the event that a complaint is filed against a public officer or employee concerning his SALN, the Office of the Ombudsman shall be obliged to comply, not with the review procedure for heads of office in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, but with the procedure for administrative complaints as laid out in Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Although in an administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman, the public officer or employee is no longer afforded the opportunity for corrective action on his SALN, he is still allowed to file counter-affidavits and other evidence in his defense.[70] In sum, this Court finds substantial evidence that petitioner and his wife have lawful sources of income other than petitioners salary as a government official that enabled them to acquire several real properties in their names and travel abroad. It also rules that while petitioner may be guilty of negligence in accomplishing his SALN, he did not commit gross misconduct or dishonesty, for there is no substantial evidence of his intent to deceive the authorities and conceal his other sources of income or any of the real properties in his and his wifes names. Hence, the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from public service and all other accessory penalties on petitioner is indeed too harsh. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to pay attention to the details and proper form of his SALN, resulting in the imprecision of the property descriptions and inaccuracy of certain information, for which suspension from office for a period of six months, without pay, would have been appropriate penalty.[71] However, this Court takes judicial notice that petitioners birth date is on 22 March 1942, and that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 for public officials on 22 March 2007, while the present Petition was still pending. The reversal by this Court of the judgment of dismissal rendered against petitioner also consequently lifts the accessory penalties imposed upon him, including the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to his retirement benefits, having served the government since 1966, or for a span of 41 years. And since petitioner is already compulsorily retired, he can no longer serve his suspension; yet, this Court can still order, in lieu of such penalty, the forfeiture of the amount equivalent to petitioners salary for six months from his retirement benefits. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision, dated 20 July 2005, and Resolution, dated 4 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87086, which affirmed the Decision, dated 28 June 2004, and Order, dated 12 October 2004, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0347-I, dismissing petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto from service for grave misconduct and dishonesty, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto is found GUILTY of NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 2002, and as penalty therefor, it is ORDERED that the amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months be forfeited from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson   On official leave MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice * On official leave. [1] Rollo, pp. 2-82. [2] Penned by the Ombudsman Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman) Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member) Roberto T. Agagon; reviewed by Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) Director Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., with the recommending approval of Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol, and approved by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo, id. at 603-624. [3] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring, id. at 86-96. [4] Id. at 102-107. [5] Id. at 102. [6] Id. at 108-114. [7] In OMB-C-C-03-05130-1, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution, dated 14 April 2004, found petitioner liable for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, Republic Act No. 1379 (Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth), and perjury. [8] Penned by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo. Rollo, pp. 115-125. [9] Penned by the Ombudsman Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman) Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member) Roberto T. Agagon; reviewed by Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) A Director Jose T. de Jesus, Jr. with the recommending approval of Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol and approved by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo. Id. at 603-624. [10] Id. at 622. [11] Penned by the Ombudsman Investigating Panel composed of Special Prosecutor Officer III (Chairman) Orlando I. Ines, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Ma. Isabel A. Alcantara, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II (Member) Evangeline Y. Grafil, and Special Prosecution Officer III (Member) Roberto T. Agagon with the recommending approval of Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (PIAB) A Director Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol and approved by Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Simeon V. Marcelo. Id. at 625-637. [12] Id. at 713-714. [13] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring. Id. at 890-891. [14] Id. at 95. [15] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada concurring. Id. at 98. [16] Id. at 28-29. [17] Id. at 35. [18] Id. at 69. [19] Id. at 1191-1193. [20] 366 Phil. 86 (1999). [21] 437 Phil. 289 (2002). [22] 356 Phil. 787, 804-805 (1998). [23] Section 6(a). [24] Paragraph 6(a). [25] It is in the special civil action for certiorari under Section 5, of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. (See Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 585, 588 (1986); and Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 229 Phil. 388, 390 (1986). [26] Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53, 25 November 1992, 215 SCRA 876, 881. [27] Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, supra note 20 at 104-105. [28] 378 Phil. 466 (1999). [29] G.R. No. 149999, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 624. [30] Id. at 641-642. [31] Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 623, 631. [32] Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996). [33] Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico, Jr., G.R. No. L-47051, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 716, 729. [34] Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, 123 Phil. 354, 357 (1966). [35] Gravador v. Mamigo, 127 Phil. 136, 142 (1967). [36] Rollo, pp. 102-114. [37] Id. [38] Id. at 632. [39] Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II (7th Revised edition), p. 636. [40] Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. [41] Rollo, pp. 38-40. [42] Records, pp. 213-220. [43] Id. at 221-243. [44] Id. at 244-245. [45] Rollo, p. 94. [46] Id. at 906. [47] Depreciation is a reasonable allowance for deterioration of property arising out of its use or employment in business or trade. It is allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes only, but it is not actually paid out. (See Section 34(F) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.) [48] Records, pp. 11-12. [49] Id. at 129-130. [50] Rollo, p. 56. [51] The 9 unofficial foreign trips taken by petitioner, plus the 17 foreign trips taken by his wife. [52] Rollo, p. 13. [53] Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 225, 245 (2000); Philippine Fruit & Vegetable Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil. 929, 938 (1999). [54] Records, p. 10. [55] Rollo, pp. 619-620. [56] Id. at 47-50. [57] Id. at 368-319, 409-417, 577-601. [58] Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 438, 458 (2000). [59] Rollo, pp. 91-94. [60] Id. at 940-941. [61] Record, p. 10. [62] In re Impeachment of Judge Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214 (1922). [63] Brucal v. Desierto, G.R. No. 152188, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 151, 165. [64] Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 112 Phil. 301, 306 (1961). [65] Article 1173, Civil Code. [66] Juan v. Arias, A.M. No. P-310, 23 August 1976, 72 SCRA 404, 410. [67] 69 Phil. 635, 642-644 (1940). [68] Aklan Electric Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 53 at 245; Philippine Fruit & Vegetable Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 53 at 938. [69] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 92, 116. [70] SEC. 5. Administrative Adjudication; How Conducted. (a) If the complaint is docketed as an administrative case, the respondent shall be furnished with a copy of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent. [71] This Court, in Cavite Crusade for Good Government v. Judge Cajigal, 422 Phil. 1 (2001), found Judge Cajigal guilty of violation of Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, and Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713 for failing to file his Statements of Assets and Liablities. However, considering his record in the judiciary and the fact that the Statements of Assets and Liabilities were later filed, this Court suspended him from office for a period of six months, without pay, ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.