#NAKAW PA MORE
MY STUDY NOTES : RULING GOOD TO CITE FOR PLUNDERERS TO AVOID CONVICTION
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the annulment of Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated August 27, 20151 and October 28, 2015,2 with prayer for the issuance of a status quo order or a temporary restraining order against the Sandiganbayan.
From 1991 to 1993, petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy. Sometime in July 1991 until June 1992, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit at the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN) pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine by emergency mode purchase, among others. On June 18, 1993, the COA issued Special Audit Report No. 92-128, uncovering an alleged overpricing of medicines at the HPN or its units, and triggering a Fact-Finding Investigation by the Office ofthe Ombudsman.
On December 11, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman commenced a preliminary investigation against petitioner and several others or Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 301 9, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as case number OMB-4-97-0789; and for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as case number OMB-4-97-0790, based on an Affidavit by COA auditors.
In OMB-4-97-0789, it was alleged that the purchase of additional drugs and medicines worth P5.56 million was not properly supported and accounted for, and that additional drugs and medicines purchased were supposedly not included in the list of drugs and medicines received by the Supply Accountable Officer of the Hospital for that period. Petitioner was included as a respondent for being a signatory of the checks involved.
In OMB-4-97-0790, it was alleged that supplies and materials amounting to P6,663,440.70 were purchased but equipment were delivered, instead of the items indicated in the purchase orders. Petitioner was included as a respondent in the OMB-4-97-0790 because he allegedly recommended the approval of the purchase orders and signed the certificates of emergency purchases.
These cases, however, were dismissed against petitioner for lack of probable cause in a Joint Resolution dated March 8, 1999.
A few years after petitioner's retirement from the service in 2001, Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo issued an Internal Memorandum dated October 11, 2004, recommending a new fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation relative to other transactions in other units and offices of the Philippine Navy. Pursuant to this Internal Memorandum, a new Affidavit Complaint dated February 22, 2006 was filed by the Ombudsman against petitioner and several others, this time, for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, docketed as case number OMB-P-C-06-0129-A.
Notices of the new preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old address in Kawit, Cavite, which he had already vacated in 1980. Thus, petitioner was not informed of the proceedings in the new preliminary investigation. Unknown to petitioner, eight (8) Informations were filed by the Ombudsman against him and the other accused before the Sandiganbayan on August 5, 2011. The first set of Informations, consisting of four (4) Informations docketed as Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, SB-11-CRM-0424, SB-11-CRM-0426 & SB-11-CRM-0427, charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, while the remaining four (4) Informations, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0429, SB-11-CRM-0430, SB-11-CRM-0432 & SB-11-CRM-0433, charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019.
Petitioner and his co-accused were charged for allegedly g1vmg unwarranted benefit to several pharmaceutical companies, certifying the existence of an emergency, and approving the emergency purchase of overpriced medicines without the proper bidding. It was determined that no emergency existed and the overpriced items bought were only kept in stock and were, essentially, over-the-counter drugs.
More particularly, petitioner's participation is limited to his issuance of the Certificates of Emergency Purchase3 that do not indicate the actual condition obtaining at the time of the purchase to justify the emergency purchase.
It was only sometime in July 2014, when petitiOner was about to travel to the United States, that he learned of the pending cases before the Sandiganbayan by virtue of a hold departure order issued against him. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail with Appearance of Counsel and Motion for Preliminary Investigation before the Sandiganbayan. With his motion granted, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were deferred with respect to petitioner and a new preliminary investigation for petitioner was conducted.
Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and speedy trial were violated by the inordinate delay of the case.
In its May 7, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman nonetheless resolved to maintain the Informations filed against petitioner. According to the Ombudsman, the Affidavit Complaint filed on February 22, 2006, which resulted in the filing of the August 5, 2011 Informations, was based on a new investigation. Thus, petitioner's "inordinate delay" argument does not apply.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Informations before the Sandiganbayan, claiming that the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations having conducted the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation for too long, in violation of his rights to a speedy trial and to due process. According to petitioner, the protracted conduct of the fact-finding and preliminary investigations lasted for eighteen (18) years.
Hence, it was inordinate and oppressive. Petitioner argued that "'there was already this case to speak of pending against" him since both sets of factfinding and preliminary investigations conducted by the Ombudsman were triggered by the same COA report.
The Ombudsman filed its Comment and/or Opposition, arguing that the preliminary investigations conducted against petitioner in the different periods (from 1996 to 1999 and from 2006 to 2011) involved different transactions pursuant to the various findings embodied in the COA Special Audit Report of 1993. In fact, so the Ombudsman argued, the COA Audit Report is not a prerequisite to any of its investigation and it may conduct fact-finding and/or preliminary investigation with or without said repmi.
In his Reply to the Ombudsman's Comment and/or Opposition, petitioner insisted, among others, that it still took the Ombudsman another six (6) years to file the Informations against him.
In a Resolution dated August 27, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash and sustained the prosecution's position. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated October 28, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion to Quash. He argues that the eight (8) Informations should have been quashed by the Sandiganbayan considering that the Ombudsman had lost its authority to file them since petitioner's constitutional rights to both the speedy disposition of cases and to due process were grossly violated by the inordinate delay of almost 18 years in conducting the fact-finding and preliminary investigations. Petitioner further argues that, with the Ombudsman losing its authority to file the Information, the Sandiganbayan also lost its jurisdiction over the crimes charged in consequence.
In its Comment,4 respondent People of the Philippines prays for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner's constitutional rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were not violated. Respondent stresses that, prior to 2006, petitioner had no case to speak of since it was only in 2007 when the Ombudsman recommended his indictment. It differentiated COA's audit investigation from 1993 to 1996 as administrative in nature, from the preliminary investigation from 1996 to 2006 for the cases which were dismissed in favor of petitioner, and from the preliminary investigation conducted from 2006 to 2011 where petitioner's involvement was established.
Respondent further asserts that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution since it was "firmly anchored on a judicious appreciation of the facts and relevant case law."
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply to Comment (On Petition for Certiorari With Application for Status Quo Order and/or Temporary Restraining Order) asserting that respondent is guilty of "hair-splitting" by distinguishing between the fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations conducted in 1999 and in 2006 since they both originated from the June 18, 1993 COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128.
Essentially, the principal issue is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.
The petition is meritorious.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a court or tribunal is whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious as to amount to an "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."5 Grave abuse of discretion was found in cases where a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.6chanrobleslaw
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner invoked Section 3, paragraph (d) of Rule 117, asserting that the Ombudsman had lost its authority to file the Infonnations against him for having conducted the fact-finding and preliminary investigations too long. He raised a similar argument in the present petition-that the Ombudsman had no more authority to file the Informations since petitioner's rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were violated.
In denying the Motion to Quash, the Sandiganbayan ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ultimately, the results of the 2006 preliminary investigation itself may not be impugned due to inordinate delay that would rise to the level of being violative of herein accused's right to speedy disposition of cases protected under the Constitution. If ignorance is bliss, the accused had been spared from the travails of the preliminary investigation which started in 2006, not like the other respondents who showed up or were involved therein. By this Court's reckoning it took the OMB-MOLEO only two (2) years, six (6) months and nineteen (days) [sic] from August 7, 2007 after the issues were joined with the filing of the last counteraffidavit therein and the issuance of the Resolution by Graft Investigator & Prosecution Officer Marissa S. Bernal on February 25, 2010, which terminated the preliminary investigation process, finding probable cause. Furthermore, as requested by the accused, the OMB-Office of the Special Prosecutor again conducted a new or another preliminary investigation upon order of this Court, resulting in a new resolution, dated May 7, 2015, which maintained the informations herein. This was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on May 15, 2015. This investigation only took a little over than six (6) months and, therefore. could not be said to be violative of movant's right to a speedy disposition of his case. There is no showing that movant was made to endure any vexatious process during the said periods of investigation.
We disagree.
In Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division),7 this Court has laid down the guiding principle in determining whether the right of an accused to the speedy disposition of cases had been violated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 16, Atiicle lil of the Constitution declares in no uncertain tenns that "[A]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which We find to be in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Below is a summary of the proceedings conducted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents claim that the investigation conducted by the COA from 1993 to 1996 was a "special audit which is administrative in nature"; thus, it should not be included in counting the number of years lapsed. They further contend that the preliminary investigations conducted from 1996 to 2006 which pertain to the "overpricing of medicines" procured through emergency purchase never included petitioner, but involved other PN officials, employees, and a private individual. Respondents maintain that it was only in 2006 that petitioner was implicated in said questionable transactions. Moreover, the preliminary investigations conducted from 1993 to 1996 against petitioner refer to different transactions, specifically, for Unaccounted Drugs and Medicines (docketed as OMB-4-97-0789) and for Conversion (docketed as OMB-4-97-0790), thus, cannot be considered in determining if his right to speedy disposition of cases had been violated.
While it may be argued that there was a distinction between the two sets of investigations conducted in 1996 and 2006, such that they pertain to distinct acts of different personalities, it cannot be denied that the basis for both sets of investigations emanated from the same COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128, which was issued as early as June 18, 1993. Thus, the Ombudsman had more than enough time to review the same and conduct the necessary investigation while the individuals implicated therein, such as herein petitioner, were still in active service.
Even assuming that the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128 was only turned over to the Ombudsman on December 11, 1996 upon the filing of the Affidavit ofthe COA Auditors, still, it had been in the Ombudsman's possession and had been the subject of their review and scrutiny for at least eight (8) years before Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation, and at least sixteen (16) years before the Ombudsman found probable cause on February 25, 2010.
Nevertheless, even if we start counting from Tanodbayan Marcelo's issuance of Internal Memorandum on September 30, 2004, there was still at least six (6) years which lapsed before the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause.
We find it necessary to emphasize that the speedy disposition of cases covers not only the period within which the preliminary investigation was conducted, but also all stages to which the accused is subjected, even including fact-finding investigations conducted prior to the preliminary investigation proper. We explained in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:8
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (citations omitted; Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the subject transactions were allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992, and the fact-finding and preliminary investigations were ordered to be conducted by Tanodbayan Marcelo in 2004, the length of time which lapsed before the Ombudsman was able to resolve the case and actually file the Informations against petitioner was undeniably long-drawnout.
Any delay in the investigation and prosecution of cases must be duly justified. The State must prove that the delay in the prosecution was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it.9 Our discussion in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division)10 is instructive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service."
In the present case, respondents failed to submit any justifiable reason for the protracted conduct of the investigations and in the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. Instead, respondents submit that "the cases subject of this petition involve issues arising from complex procurement transactions that were conducted in such a way as to conceal overpricing and other irregularities, by conniving PN officers from different PN units and private individuals."
A review of the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128, however, shows that it clearly enumerated the scope of the audit, the transactions involved, the scheme employed by the concemed PN officers, and the possible basis for the filing of a complaint against the individuals responsible for the overpricing. Respondents' argument that the case involves "complex procurement transactions" appears to be unsupported by the facts presented.
There is no question that petitiOner asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases at the earliest possible time. In his Counter-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman during the reinvestigation of the case in 2014, petitioner had already argued that dismissal of the case is proper because the long delayed proceedings violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. This shows that petitioner wasted no time to assert his right to have the cases against him dismissed.
As for the prejudice caused by the delay, respondents claim that no prejudice was caused to petitioner from the delay in the second set of investigations because he never participated therein and was actually never even informed of the proceedings anyway. We cannot agree with this position. A similar assertion was struck down by this Court in Coscolluela, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan (Corpuz)illumined:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Adopting respondents' position would defeat the very purpose of the right against speedy disposition of cases. Upholding the same would allow a scenario where the prosecution may deliberately exclude certain individuals from the investigation only to file the necessary cases at another, more convenient time, to the prejudice of the accused. Clearly, respondents' assertion is subject to abuse and cannot be countenanced.
In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the resolution of the cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a respondent in the investigation conducted from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the "overpricing of medicines'' procured through emergency purchase, he has already been deprived of the ability to adequately prepare his case considering that he may no longer have any access to records or contact with any witness in support of his defense. This is even aggravated by the fact that petitioner had been retired for fifteen (15) years. Even if he was never imprisoned and subjected to trial, it cannot be denied that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by virtue of the delay in the resolution of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 27, 2015 and October 28, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, 0424, 0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, 0424, 0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 for violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres (Ret.).
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Peralta, Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 170-177. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael R. Lagos and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Tuesday, May 9, 2017
TORRES VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN G.R. NOS- 221562-69, OCTOBER 05, 2016 : INORDINATE DELAY RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT
9MAY17_280TH TIME_SHELL ROBBED EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PAY
ATTENTION
SENATOR RICHARD "DICK" GORDON
CHAIRMAN
Accountability of Public Officers & Investigations (Blue Ribbon)
 |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE CHAIRMAN |
GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
ATTY. DANTE GIERRAN
DIRECTOR
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
SHELL ROBBED
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PAY
A case of David vs. Goliath by Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.
image credit:david-and-goliath-shane-robinson.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation robbed employee's retirement pay by circumventing the Retirement Pay Law, while ranking Supreme Court of the Philippines personnel, the PIO chief, is delaying and preventing due course to its recovery, whereby:
NUMBER 1. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS CONSTITUTING CORRUPT PRACTICES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER RA 3019_ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
REPUBLIC ACT 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party (myself, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.) including the Government, or giving any private party (PSPC, SHELL) any unwarranted benefits, (NON-PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT PAY) advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative (ATTY. THEODORE TE, functions) or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices (Atty. Theodore Te, an officer of one offices of the Supreme Court, the PIO) or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
REPUBLIC ACT 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party (myself, Antonio L. Buensuceso Jr.) including the Government, or giving any private party (PSPC, SHELL) any unwarranted benefits, (NON-PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT PAY) advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative (ATTY. THEODORE TE, functions) or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices (Atty. Theodore Te, an officer of one offices of the Supreme Court, the PIO) or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
NUMBER 2. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS WHICH OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE OR TEND TO OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE THE SUCCESSFUL APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS BY VIOLATING WILLFULLY, DELIBERATELY THE PROVISION OF THE LAW PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1829 SECTION 1(e)
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
NUMBER 2. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS WHICH OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE OR TEND TO OBSTRUCT OR FRUSTRATE THE SUCCESSFUL APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS BY VIOLATING WILLFULLY, DELIBERATELY THE PROVISION OF THE LAW PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1829 SECTION 1(e)
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829 PENALIZING
OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
MALACAÑANG
M a n i l a
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them;
WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
MALACAÑANG
M a n i l a
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them;
WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
NUMBER 3. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS WILLFULLY, DELIBERATELY in violation of RULE VI, of the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713)
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS AND PETITIONS MANDATED BY THE Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713)
(Republic Act No. 6713) RULE 6 _Duties of public officials and employees
Section 3. In case of written requests, petitions or motions, sent by means of letters, telegrams, or the like, the official or employee in charge shall act on the same within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, provided that:
(a) If the communication is within the jurisdiction of the office or agency, the official or employee must:
(1) Write a note or letter of acknowledgement where the matter is merely routinary or the action desired may be acted upon in the ordinary course of business of the department, office or agency, specifying the date when the matter will be disposed of and the name of the official or employee in charge thereof.
NUMBER 4. ATTY. THEODORE TE COMMITTED AND CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTING ACTS WILLFULLY, DELIBERATELY in violation of ARTICLE XI SECTION 1 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, to wit:
Article XI section 1 of the Philippine constitution
ARTICLE XI : Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
TO THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN RE : AC NUMBER 10084
AND GR NUMBER 183273
At this point, AC NUMBER 10084 and GR NUMBER 183273 by virtue of the evidences showing prima facie proofs of miscarriage of justice are needed to be reviewed and accorded proper adjudication. Farther neglect through your gross inexcusable negligence will cause irreparable damage not only to the Filipino peoples' interest and mine but most importantly to your own interest in keeping legitimacy of holding your position as Justices of the Supreme Court. Your Honors, kindly correct the administrative and judicial errors you have committed while there is still time. When there is conflict between the Constitution or Law versus the Supreme Court internal rules, the Constitution and/or the law prevail. Your Honors, with all due respect, please be reminded that the discretionary power in your possession is for the advancement of justice not for the promotion of injustice .
Kindly, show us your people that the Supreme Court is not really composed of people and Justices beholden to Big Money interest, pretending to be deaf and blind to the plight of the oppressed and the defenseless. Your Honors, please scrape the hardened calluses from your eyes...see your people, hear what they are saying...your people suffer from injustice...they cry for justice then deliver justice to them....not tomorrow but now.
THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE.
9MAY17_287TH TIME_CONTINUING DAILY FOLLOW UP OF SET OF FOLLOW UP E-MAILS DATED MARCH 15, 2015
- ATTENTION
-
SENATOR RICHARD "DICK" GORDONCHAIRMANAccountability of Public Officers & Investigations (Blue Ribbon)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE CHAIRMAN
- COUNT 287 RENEWAL
IN RE A.C. NUMBER 10084_ATTY RAUL QUIROZ DISBARMENT CASE“It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our society that he stands “as a shield,” …, in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as “moral character”.”
Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239.By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice, a vital function of democracy, a failure of which is disastrous to society. While the duty to uphold the constitution and obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities over and beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As servant of the law, a lawyer ought to make himself an example for others to emulate. He should be possessed of and must continue to possess good moral character.EXCERPTED FROMThe Lawyer's OathThe Oath: The Lawyer's IdealBy J. Jose L. Sabio, 
- Atty. Quiroz presented the document "Annex 5" shown above as a valid quitclaim document though that piece of document was not verified.
In his effort to achieve legitimacy of the illegitimate "Annex 5" quitclaim document, Atty Quiroz concocted a fraudulent alibi on his sworn statement that Annex 5 was not verified because according to him, when Ms. Eva Rojas, the remunerations supervisor, asked me my residence certificate, I told Ms. Rojas that I do not have it with me and I will return to give it to her for verification purposes. That was a lie, deceitful statement of fact because if it was true that Ms. Rojas asked me my residence certificate for Annex 5 verification purposes, why when we met again on October 23, 2003, when I got my PRB (performance related bonus, Annex J), she did not ask for my residence certificate for verification. Let it be known that both Annex 5 and Annex J are not verified. Hence, Atty. Quiroz is again proven to be lying, he should be disbarred.
As Atty. Quiroz wanted to prove his allegations of financial difficulties that led to the closure of the old plant he swore that in fact the closed plant was undergoing demolition. He even bragged about the contractor who will be doing the demolition. However, the demolition of the old plant demolished his credibility and sent him more toward disbarment. Why ? Because he is proven to be lying again, that Shell is undergoing financial difficulties due to the fact that the demolition costs Shell an incredible sum of PHP 129,950,000.00 as per his own presented documentary evidence. Is this the manner of a company undergoing financial difficulties, to spend PHP 129,950,000.00 for demolition work alone at the same time of having financial problems. Again, Atty. Quiroz is obviously lying, hence, he should be disbarred. -
This phrase "in view of the requirements of the business" was intentionally omitted from the sentence from where it is supposed to be included. tthis phrase having been taken out from the sentence by Atty. Quiroz's defense lawyers avoided showing that there was actually " no redundancy" at the time when i was terminated from employment.
- COMPLAINT REMINDER_15MAR16_REPUBLIC ACT 7641 CIRCUMVENTED BY SHELL ...PROMOTER GUARDIANS OF LAW SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED
- 17TH TIME_15MAR16_TWELFTH PERSUASIVE APPEAL_SERENO LECTURES ARTICLE XI SECTION 1 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
- ATTY. THEODORE TE_15MAR16_ E-MAIL RESPONSE MODEL FROM THE PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
- ATTY THEODORE TE_15MAR16_9TH COUNT _PERSUASIVE APPEAL _ MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
- ATTY THEODORE TE:_15MAR16_PERSUASIVE REMINDER_8TH COUNT PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT E-MAIL RESPONSE MODEL FROM THE USA
- SUPREME COURT_15MAR16 _89th FOLLOW UP_E-MAIL ADDRESS INQUIRY PERSONNEL NAME AND POSITION
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- LAPITAN_15MAR16_67th FOLLOW UP_ OBJECTION ON THE MATTER OF SENDING NOTICE BY THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
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- GEUS_15MAR16_66th FOLLOW UP_REITERATION OF DEMAND PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT PAY
- Dishonest scales are an abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is His delight... Proverbs Chapter 11 v. 1
- Retirement Pay Law circumvented by Shell subject to penal provision provided for by Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
OIL Deregulation Law as yoke to the shoulders of oil companies doing business in the Philippines is a blatant lie. The fact is this law shielded oil companies from loses if ever there might be. As we can see, for every change in the cost petroleum products they can automatically adjust the price of their products to a point that is profitable for them.. Atty. Quiroz sworn statement that due to the Oil Deregulation Law it makes it harder for Shell to do business that made Shell decide to close an old plant is deceitful lie. Oil Deregulation Law is not a yoke but an oxen oil companies can ride on, contrary to Atty. Quiroz sworn statements.
8TH TIME_15MAR16_BITUMEN PLANT_ATTY. QUIROZ'S DECEITFUL INTENT TO CHEAT Atty. Raul Quiroz act of calling the BITUMEN PLANT as a "commercial business unit " and differentiating it from the "refinery business unit" carries with the deceitful intent to cheat. By exalting that difference he might be able to justify to terminate operators from Process 2 then hire new operators. But the truth is the "refinery business unit" is the same as the "commercial business unit". Both are plants ran and maintained by operators. Both have pipelines, motors, pumps to start and stop, valves to open or close. Both have raw materials and finished products and storage tanks and control room. The BITUMEN PLANT is just similar to the LPG Terminal (Shell Gas Eastern Inc.) that we ourselves are operating. In SGEI instead of bitumen, we receive liquified petroleum gas (lpg) in bulk quantities from abroad and the refinery and distribute it to different destinations in the Philippines and Asia. It is not that he called it "commercial business unit" it would be run by employees wearing tuxedos but with operators wearing safety suits. Clearly, Atty. Quiroz having sworn that" refinery business unit" is different from "commercial business unit" carries with that assertion his intention to cheat purposely to justify termiinating emplloyess from the old plant and hiring new employees for the BITUMEN plant.
It is a fact that Shell closed an old plant and terminated employees. Likewise, opened a new plant BITUMEN IMPORT FACILITY and hire new employees.
It is not true that there existed redundancy of positions when I was terminated from employment.
This document is PRB(performance related bonus) paid to me about 8 months after I was terminated from employment, a circumstantial evidence that the Ranking which showed that I was second from the poorest work performer was rigged and untrue as Atty. Quiroz deceitfully promoted.
The Ranking from where the result of which serve as the basis on who is to be terminated was rigged. It was rigged due to the fact that the list of employees to be terminated was already prepared and submitted to DOLE (Department of Labor and Employment before the Ranking exercise was conducted.. This is the most vicious lie that Atty. Raul Quiroz is guilty of. He must be disbarred. I was illegally terminated from employment on account of Atty. Quiroz promotion of Shell's wrongdoing. I should have been reinstated back to my work until my retirement.
This is the set of 14 persuasive appeals filed. Last update 11 April 2016
THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE.
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