In re Impeachment of Honorable ANTONIO HORRILLENO,_March 20, 1922

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC March 20, 1922 In re Impeachment of Honorable ANTONIO HORRILLENO, Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government MALCOLM, J.: Charges against the Honorable Antonio Horrilleno, judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District have been aired by Abundio Enrile before the Wood-Forbes Mission, the Governor-General, and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. Judges Horrilleno has joined with his accuser in asking for an official investigation and this has now been concluded by the Attorney-General. The law officer of the Government, in his report to this count, submits the evidence presented, with the recommendation that the charges laid against Judge Horrilleno be dismissed. It is, therefore, for the court to determine from the record before it, including the petition of the complaint Enrile, the answer to the same made to the Secretary of Justice by Judge Horrilleno, and the record of the official investigation, if sufficient cause exists under the law for the court to recommend the removal of Judge Antonio Horrilleno to the Governor-General. The charges made by Abundio Enrile against Judge Antonio Horrilleno, as understood by the latter, were (1) In negligently and carelessly delaying the case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, entitled,Abintestato del finado Nicolas Nuñez y Enrile (Intestate Estate of Nicolas Nuñez y Enrile, deceased, and (2) in that Judge Horrilleno was a political judge. The specification of misconduct las mentioned has not been pressed. The allegations of negligence and carelessness (negligencia y descuido) have to do with the civil case, Abintestato del finado Nicolas Nuñez y Enrile, begun on April 23, 1912, and still in litigation. The complainant charges that the respondent judge has willfully delayed the hearing of this case and has taken no action, although his attention has repeatedly been called to the numerous irregularities committed by the administrator in the performance of his duties. It is said that six cases, which were submitted for adjudication to the respondent much later than that in which the complainant is interested, have already been decided. Insinuation are also made that the judge has lived on a parcel of land constituting a portion of the property involved in the action. Among the conceded facts, which tend to dissipate completely the allegations of the complainant, there can be mentioned the following: Judge Horrilleno was appointed auxiliary judge of the seventh group which includes the twenty-sixth Judicial District in March, 1919; case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga entitled, "Abintestato del finado Nicolas Nuñez y Enrile," was first submitted to him on July 1, 1919; and the various continuances granted by the judge have been either on account of the petition of the parties themselves or on account of the court being able to hold sessions in Zamboanga for short periods at a time. While it is admitted that respondent lived on lot 3, of block No. 26, cadastral case No. 7888 of the municipality of Zamboanga, he had no means of knowing that the land would become involved in a suit about to be heard by him and he has paid the customary rental therefor. With the foregoing the outstanding facts of record, we should next turn to the Philippine law on the subject of removal and suspension of judges of first instance (sec. 173, Administrative Code), in order to determine therefrom whether or not it is our duty to ask the Chief Executive to remove the respondent judge from office. The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance under Philippine law are two: (1) Serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. The latter grounds is not involved in these proceedings. As to the first, the law provides that "sufficient cause" must exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court involving "serious misconduct." The adjective is "serious;" that is, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The noun is "misconduct;" that is, a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The word "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error or judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. (Lawlor vs. People [1874], 74 Ill., 228; Citizens' Insurance Co. vs. Marsh [1861], 41 Pa., 386; Miller vs. Roby [1880], 9 Neb., 471; Smith vs. Cutler [1833], 10 Wend. [N.Y.], 590; U.S. vs. Warner [1848], 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16643; In re Tighe [1904], 89 N.Y. Suprr., 719.) The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme Court has not as yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file the charges without further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-General's investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgement to determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-General. Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal case. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (State ex rel. Attorney-General vs. Hasty [1913], 184 Ala., 121; State vs. Hastings [1893], 37 Neb., 96.) Serious misconduct on the part of Judge Horrilleno has not here been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. The most that can be said for the charges made by complainant, would be that the judge may have been careless in the performance of his judicial duties. There is extant absolutely no proof that the respondent judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively. On the contrary, the testimony of the most prominent citizens of Mindanao and Sulu including the Sultan of Sulu, Senator Hadji Butu, Datu Ussman, Governor Charles M. Moore, and practically the entire bar of Zamboanga, Jolo, and Davao is unanimously in favor of the excellent reputation of Judge Horrilleno. Sufficient of the cases tried by Judge Horrilleno have been elevated to this court for all of us to have become conscious of the careful performance of his onerous and responsible duties, and familiar and the excellent quality of his judicial output. We would be remiss ourselves if, knowing of the publicity which has been given to the attacks on the good name of Judge Horrilleno, we should not as publicly announce our faith in his judicial character. Judge Horrilleno justly merits and is granted completely exoneration. It results that in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, sufficient cause does not exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency on the part of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno, judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District, as justifies the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-General. Without further action, therefore, the papers in these proceedings against Judge Horrilleno shall be filed, and a copy of this decision shall be forwarded to him through official channels. So ordered. Araullo, C.J., Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur. Romualdez, J., took no part.

ROMULO G. DINSAYA.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996] ROMULO G. DINSAY, petitioner, vs. ATTY. LEOPOLDO D. CIOCO, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N FRANCISCO, J.: Sometime in 1980, Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the Bank) certain properties as security for the payment of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted in the payment of the loan for which reason the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale held on March 8, 1994 and conducted by Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza, the mortgaged properties were sold to the bank, the sole bidder. Thereafter, a Certificate of Sheriffs Sale[1] was executed by respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco, then Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff,[2] which document was notarized by Judge Vivencio T. Ibrado, Sr.[3] on the same day.[4] In April of 1984,[5] records disclose that Page Four (4) of the said Certificate was surreptitiously substituted. The new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of P3,263,182.67[6] to onlyP730,000.00.[7] Consequent to such anomaly, respondent and Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza, were administratively charged. In the first Dinsay case, a per curiam resolution promulgated on December 12, 1986, we decreed their dismissal for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service.[8] In the instant complaint, respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco is now sought to be disbarred on the basis of the aforementioned incident that triggered his untimely dismissal. Respondent, interposing res adjudicata, maintains that he may no longer be charged with disbarment as this was deemed adjudicated in the first Dinsay case. We find this contention to be without merit. The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers,[9] as in this case. Neither can it be successfully argued that the instant disbarment case has been already adjudicated in the first Dinsay case. Therein, respondent was administratively proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the supervisory authority of the Court.[10] Herein, respondent is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over members of the legal profession. While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[11] However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.[12] In this case, we agree with the findings of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) that the participation of the respondent in the changing of the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale affects his fitness as a member of the bar. As a lawyer, respondent knows that it is patently illegal to change the content of the said certificate after its notarization, it being already a public document.[13] Respondent cannot seek refuge behind his averment that it was purely ministerial on his part to sign the new Page Four (4) of the Certificate.[14] We struck down this argument in the first Dinsay case and we will not adopt a different view here. At any rate, respondent cannot disclaim knowledge of the legal consequences of his illegal act. Thus: It should be noted that the substitution done would have left PLAMACO open to a deficiency judgment case whereas the original bid by the BANK would totally extinguish PLAMACOs obligation to the former. In such case, PLAMACO was effectively defrauded of the difference between original bid and that substituted by respondent.[15] Considering the foregoing, we find the recommendation of the OBC that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as proper. WHEREFORE, ATTY. LEOPOLDO D. CIOCO is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from notice hereof, with a warning that repetition of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the personal record of the respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ.,concur. [1] Dated March 8, 1984; Exhibit A; Rollo, pp. 19-23. [2] Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacolod City. [3] Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bacolod City. [4] Exhibit A-1; Rollo, p. 23. [5] Annex A; Rollo, p. 9. [6] Exhibit A-2; Rollo, p. 22. [7] Exhibit E-1; Rollo, p. 27. [8] Dinsay v. Cioco, 146 SCRA 146 (1986). [9] 50 CJS 603; See Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93, 100 [1989]. [10]See Icasiano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377 [1992]. [11] Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 649 [1989]. [12] Id., citing In Re Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 [1975]; See Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 585 [1991]. [13] Rule 132, Sec. 19. xxx xxx xxx Public documents are: (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; x x x. [14] Rollo, p. 38. [15] Report and Recommendation, OBC, p. 4; Rollo, p. 56.